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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the October 2000 Term, the Supreme Court
delivered major setbacks for employees in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams,' which upheld mandatory and binding arbitration of federal and state employment discrimination claims
through arbitration clauses forced upon employees as a
condition of employment, and in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 2 which shielded state
employers from federal court law suits brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act by victims of disability
discrimination in employment. Employees escaped harm in
Pollard v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co.,3 in which the Court
followed nearly unanimous circuit court of appeals precedent
and rather clear statutory language in deciding that the Title
VII front pay remedy is not subject to the limitations on
compensatory damages (known as "caps") set forth in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. 4 This article discusses these and
other cases from the October 2000 Term of the Court,
involving arbitration, attorney's fees, opposition to sexual
harassment and ERISA preemption.
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS

Arbitration substantially occupied the time of the Court
in the 2000 term. The Court decided five cases involving
arbitration, three in the labor and employment law context.
1.
2.
3.
4.

121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001).
42 U.S.C. §§ 198l(a)(l) & (2) (1994).
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A fourth involved consumer arbitration law but has
significant implications for employment arbitration.5 Two of
the arbitration cases involved efforts to enforce arbitration
agreements and two involved post-arbitration challenges to
awards. The number of cases and the interest in the cases,
as exemplified by the thirty-seven amicus briefs filed in the
four cases, demonstrates the growing importance of
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
These
arbitration cases followed Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp.6 in the 1998 term and Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bi[[
Harbert Construction Co.' in the 1999 term. The Court has
already granted certiorari in an arbitration case for the 2001
term. 8 Arbitration cases promise to continue to be the foc;us
of employment litigation for the foreseeable future.
A.

The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
1. Circuit City Stores v. Adams

The most publicized, and certainly the most significant,
arbitration case of the 2000 term was Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams. 9 Saint Clair Adams signed Circuit City's Dispute
Resolution Agreement ("DRA") at the time he applied for
employment. The DRA specified that it was not a contract of
employment. Had Adams refused to execute the DRA, whicJ;t
required binding arbitration of all employment-related
disputes, his application would not have been considered by
Circuit City. After several years of employment as a sales
5. The fifth case, C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001), involved the question of whether an Indian tribe
waived sovereign immunity by agreeing in a commercial contract to arbitrate
disputes and to permit the enforcement of arbitration awards in state court. This
case will not be discussed in detail because of its minimal relevance to employment
law. 6. 525 U.S. 70 {1998} {holding that union waiver of employee right to litigate
statutory claim must be clear and unequivocal).
7. 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (holding Federal Arbitration Act venue provisions are
pennissive rather than mandatory).
8. EEOC v.Waffle House Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S.
Ct. 1401 (2001). See discussion of the case infra notes 160-190 and accompanying
text, and Editor's Note, infra note 191.
9. 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001). The case drew a total of eighteen amicus briefs, nine
in support of Circuit City's position and nine in support of Adams' position. All facts
recited herein are from the Supreme Court opinion unless otherwise noted.
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counselor, Adams sued Circuit City in California state court.
He alleged violations of state statutory discrimination law and
several common law claims relating to his employment.
Circuit City persuaded the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California to stay Adams' state court
action and order arbitration. 10 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA")" was not applicable to the case because the DRA was
part of an employment contract, and the FAA excludes from
its coverage contracts of employment." The Ninth Circuit's
decision conflicted with those of eleven other circuits, which
had read the FAA's exclusion for employment contracts more
narrowly." The Ninth Circuit's holding left arbitration
agreements in employment contracts to be enforced under
state law, since, absent FAA coverage, no federal mechanism
for enforcement existed outside the collective bargaining
14

context.
The arguments in the Supreme Court focused on the
language and the sparse legislative history of Sections 1 and
2 of the FAA. enacted in 1925. Section 1 contains the
employment contract exclusion which states, "[N]othing
herein, contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers
15
engaged in foreign or intersta,te commerce."
Section 2
provides, in relevant part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
10. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6215. at '2 [N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 1998). reu'd, 194 F.3d
1070 [9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 1302 [2001).
11. 9 u.s.c. §§ l ·16 [2000).
12. 194 F.3d 1070, 1070·71 [9th Cir. 1999). reu'd, 121 S. Ct. 1302 [2001).
13. See 121 S. Ct. at 1306-07 (citing McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573,
575-576 [10th Cir. 1998): O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 274 [4th Cir.
1997): Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 [7th Cir. 1997): Cole v.
Burns Int'l Sec. Se:rvs.,105 F.3d 1465, 1470-1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-748 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Co. v.
Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596-601 {6th Cir. 1995); Erving v.Virginia Squires Basketball
Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 [2d Cir. 1972): Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785
(1st Cir.1971): Tenney Eng', Inc. v. United Elec. & Machine Workers of Am., 207 F.2d
450 [3d Cir. 1953)).
14. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 {1957), the Supreme
Court held that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provided for
both federal court jurisdiction and the development of federal substantive law for the
enforcement of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 451.
15. 9

u.s.c.

§ 1 [2000).
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settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as16 exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.

Circuit City urged the Court to adopt the construction of
the majority of the appellate courts that the exclusion applied
only to contracts of transportation workers." In support of
this interpretation, the employer cited the FAA's purpose of
reversing judicial hostility toward enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 1' In addition, the employer asserted two rules of
statutory construction in support of its interpretation. First,
the employer urged the Court not to read the statute to
render statutory language superfluous. Had Congress
intended to exclude all contracts of employment from the
FAA, it could have omitted all of the statutory language after
the word "employment." 19 Second, the employer contended,
the rule of ejusdem generis required the Court to read the
words following "seamen" and "railroad employees" to refer to
workers like the specified workers in kind, i.e., workers
engaged in the transportation of people and g6ods in
interstate commerce. 2° Further, the employer urged the
Court to read the term "engaged in ... commerce" in the
exclusion more narrowly than "involving commerce" in the
21
section describing agreements to which the statute applied.
The employee, Adams, argued in support of the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation, noting that it would make little sense
for Congress to exclude from coverage the contracts of those
workers over whom it clearly had commerce power,
transportation workers, and to include other workers, over
22
whom federal commerce power was far less certain in 1925.
Adams also argued that employment contracts are not
covered by Section 2 of the FAA because they are not
"contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving interstate

16. Id. § 2.
17. See Circuit City Stores, Inc., Reply Brief for Petitioner, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct.
1302, 1999 U.S. Briefs (Lexis) 1379, al '11 (Oct. 23, 2000).
18. Id.
19. Id.at*ll-12.
20. Id. at *9-10.
21. Id.
22. Circuit City Stores, Inc., Brief for Respondent, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 1302,
1999 U.S. Briefs (Lexis) 1379, at '17-18 (Sept. 19, 2000).
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commerce" since "transactions" are commercial contracts
only. 23 In addition, he pointed out that the employment
contract exclusion was inserted in response to the objections
of labor to the inclusion of worker contracts. Adams asserted
that in 1925 the term "engaged in" commerce described all
workers within the commerce power of Congress, and rejected
the notion that "involving" and "engaged" evidenced different
intent. 24 The other words in the exclusion, "any other class of
workers engaged in ... commerce" also are words of breadth.
Finally, Adams noted that since the Court had read the
coverage of the FAA to expand as the commerce power
expands, the exclusion should be read to expand
correspondingly. 25
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, which included
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas. Justice Kennedy began by reciting the Court's
decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson"" that
Congress intended in the FAA to assert fully its commerce
power, and accordingly, the scope of the statute's coverage
27
had expanded with the commerce power.
He then
addressed and rejected each of Adams' arguments. If
employment contracts were not covered by the Section 2 term
"transaction," the exclusion language of Section 1 would be
unnecessary. 28 Accordingl)I, the Court concluded, if all
employment contracts are excluded, it must be by virtue of
Sectim;i 1. 29 Section 1 cannot be read broadly, however,
because of the reference to "seamen" and "railroad
employees," a specification that would have been unnecessary
were all employment contracts excluded.'0 The employer's
reliance on the canon of ejusdem generis was persuasive to
the Court, particularly where Congress used the words
"engaged in commerce," which the majority read as having a
narrower reach than "involving commerce" or "affecting
23. Id. at *19-21.

24. Id. at '26-28.
25. Id. at *30-31.
26. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
27. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 121 S. Ct. at 1307.

28. Id. at 1308.
29. Id.
30. Id.

I
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commerce." 31 Tue majority saw its reading of "engaged in"
commerce in the FAA as consistent with its earlier
interpretations of similar language and indicated that the
interpretation of the language should not depend on the date
32
of its incorporation in the statute.
The Court concluded that the text of the statute clearly
precluded an expansive interpretation of the exclusionary
language, noting that its interpretation was in accord with
the statutory purpose of overcoming judicial hostility to
arbitration." Having found the text clear,
the Court saw no
34
need to resort to the legislative history.
Nevertheless, the
Court indicated that the legislative history was limited, and
found Adams' reliance on testimony at subcommitttCe
hearings untenable. 35 The Court saw no anomaly in
attributing to Congress an intent to exclude from the
statute's coverage the employment contracts of36workers over
whom the commerce power was most certain.
The Court
indicated that a plausible explanation '.¥as · the ' existing
arbitration prov1s10ns for seamen and the imminent
comprehensive statute governing labor relations37 for railroad
employees, which was passed the following year.
Because Adams' underlying claims involved state law, a
group of state attorneys general filed an amicus brief
indicating their concern that adoption of Circuit 38City's
position would interfere with state law and policy.
In
responding to this argument, the majority indicated30that it
was the earlier decision of Southland Corp. v. Keating, which
was reaffirmed by Allied-Bruce, 40 that required the preemption
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1308-09.
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id. The Court explained the additional workers whose contracts were
excluded as being part of a reservation of Congressional authority to enact specific
provisions for those workers clearly within the commerce power. Id.
38. Id. at 1312. Brief of the States of California. Arlzona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington and West
Virginia, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 1302,
1999 U.S. Briefs (Lexis) 1379, at '4 (Sept. 19, 2000).
39. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
40. 513 U.S. at 272.
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of state law. The Court reiterated the value of arbitration and
its desire not to frustrate employment arbitration by leaving
the enforcement to state law, which would cause unnecessary
complications for the parties."
Justices Souter and Stevens authored dissents. Justice
Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and
Breyer, read the Section 1 exclusion's use of the term
"engaged in" commerce as extending to the limits of Congress'
commerce power in 1925. 42 Since the Court in Allied Bruce
read Section 2 as evolving with time to encompass the
current extent of the commerce power, the Section 1
exclusion should be read similarly." In addition, unlike the
majority, Justice Souter had no problem relying for support
on Commerce Secretary Hoover's testimony at the subcommittee hearing, where he suggested the exclusionary
language of Section 1 to meet labor's objections to the
inclusion of workers' contracts in the statute." Justice
Souter declined to rely on the canon of ejusdem generis,
noting that the majority was using the canon to reject
legislative history, rather than to interpret the statute
where
45
the language and legislative history are unclear.
The
dissenting opinion agreed with Adams that it would be
anomalous for Congress to exclude the very workers over
whom it clearly had power, wnile including those for whom its
power was questionable. 46 Although Justice Souter agreed
with the majority that Congress may have specifically
mentioned "seamen" and "railroad workers" because of
specific legislation directed at them, he read these references
as affirming that Congress did not intend to affect existing
47
legislation, rather than limiting the exclusion.

41. 121 S. Ct. at 1313. Subsequent to the decision, the Court granted certiorari,
vacated the judgment and remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals three
other cases involving Circuit City's arbitration agreement. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Ahmed, 121 S. Ct. 1399 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ingle, 121 S. Ct. 1399
(2001): Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Al-Safm, 121 S. Ct. 1399 {2001).
42. 121 S. Ct. at 1320 {Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1319-20 (Souter, J., dissenting) {citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)).
44. Id. at 1320, 1322 (Souter, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1322 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1321-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1322 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens' dissent was joined fully by Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg and in part by Justice Souter.'" Justice
Stevens discussed the legislative history of the bill more
extensively than the majority, noting that although nothing in
the bill indicated that it would apply to anything other than
commercial and admiralty contracts, the bill drew objections
from organized labor groups concerned about its use to
enforce employment agreements and collectively bargained
contracts.49 Supporters of the bill, including the chair of the
ABA committee that drafted the legislation and Secretary of
Commerce Hoover, indicated that it was not intended to apply
to such contracts, but suggested the language
that later
0
became Section 1 to confirm the intent.' Justice Stevens
found nothing surprising in Congress' adoption of language,
perhaps unnecessary, to respond to the concerns of a bill's
51

'

opponents.
.
Justice Stevens further noted that in the early years after
passage of the statute, courts routinely found that collective
2
bargaining agreements were excluded from the Act.' Not
until 1953 did the first court decide that only contracts of
53
transportation workers were excluded.
In 1957, the Court decided Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills," in which the union urged the Court to interpret the
FAA's exclusion as applying only to transportation workers
and to order the employer to arbitrate pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement. Instead of reading the FAA as the
majority did in Circuit City, the Textile Workers Court
interpreted Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, which never mentions arbitration, to provide a cause of
action for enforcement of arbitration agreements in collective
bargaining contracts. 55 Justice Stevens read Textile Workers
56
as supportive of Adams' interpretation of the exclusion.
48. Justice Souter did not join the portion of the opinion discussing the
legislative history. Id. at 1314.
49. Id. at 1315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. {Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1316-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
55. Id. at 451.
56. 121 S. Ct. at 1317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Stevens viewed the majority's decision as
permitting a policy preference for arbitration, developed long
after enactment of the FAA, to deny the correct reading of the
statute. To Justice Stevens, the exclusion clearly was
motivated by the expressed concerns at the time that
inclusion of workers' contracts would permit powerful
employers to require powerless employees to accept
unfavorable agreements, which would then be enforceable by
the courts. 57
The significance of the Circuit City decision cannot be
overestimated. Numerous employers have adopted policies
requiring their employees to arbitrate all employment
disputes, and attorneys representing employers are already
reporting a significant increase in the number of clients
requesting development of arbitration agreements for their
employees. These arbitration policies cover state and federal
statutory and common law claims as well as contractual
claims. Although some policies allow the employee to choose
whether to agree to arbitration, most require agreement to
arbitration as a condition of employment. The FAA now
clearly provides an enforcement mechanism for such arbitration agreements, except in the transportation industry."
Had the Court read the FAA to exclude most employment
contracts, the enforcement. of arbitration agreements would
have' been left to state law. The variations and uncertainties
created would have led to years of litigation over
enforceability and might well have caused many employers to
abandon efforts to require arbitration. Alternatively, such a
decision might have spurred Congress to legislate more

57. Id. at .1318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. The decision does not delineate the precise scope of the exclusion. It might
be read to exclude only contracts of employees actually engaged in the movement of
goods or people in interstate commerce. See id. at 1307 (noting the interpretation of
most courts of appeals). Alternatively, it might exclude all contracts of employment
with employees of employers engaged in transportation. See id. at 1312 (referencing
legislation relating to air lines and their employees}. Under the former reading, a
contract with a truck driver for a manufacturing company would be excluded while a
contract with a janitor for an airline would not, while under the latter reading the
opposite result would be reached. The transportation industry remains heavily
unionized, see Cynthia Engel, Competition Drives the Trucking Industry, 124 MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Apr. 1998, at 34, 37, and collective bargaining agreement arbitration
clauses are enforceable under Section 301 of the LMRA. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
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as substantial
directly about employment arbitration,
enforceability of
questions would have been raised over the
arbitration of federal claims under state law.
A contrary decision also would have required the courts
to determine what constitutes an employment contract,
because the FAA's exclusion refers to contracts of
employment. While the Ninth Circuit found that Circuit
City's arbitration agreement was part of a contract of
employment, the agreement itself disclaimed any contractual
status. 59 The Court did not have to reach the issue of whether
the agreement was, in fact, a contract. In Gilmer v.
60
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court declined to reach
the issue of the applicability of the FAA employment contract
exclusion because the agreement to arbitrate was
contairied
1
in a securities industry registration application.6 Employers
that desired to retain arbitration systems li\;:ely would have
attempted to impose arbitration requirements in formats
similar to that of the securities industry to avoid the FAA
exclusion.
Since the decision favored enforceability, however, the
focus of future litigation is likely to be on the fairness of
arbitration agreements. 62 The Court's decision in Green Tree
63
Financial Corp. v. Rando[ph, suggests that an arbitration
agreement that precludes a plaintiff from
effectively
64
vindicating statutory rights will not be enforced. Employees
seeking to avoid arbitration of statutory claims will likely
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59. Circuit City, Inc., 194 F.3d at 1071.
60. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
61. Id. at 25 n.2 (1991). The issue also was neither raised in the courts below
nor encompassed by the petition for certiorari. Id.
62. Prior to Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit was the only circuit to hold that
employees cannot be required to waive their right to litigate future Title VII claims.
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.Sd 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). Several
California district courts have read Circuit City as overruling Duffield. See Rooz
Abras Eftekhari v. Peregrine Fin. & Secs., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16087, at *25 {N.D.
Cal. Sept. 24, 2001) (fmding that Circuit City requires plaintiff to arbitrate Title VII
claims): Olivares v. Hispanic Broad. Corp. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5760, at *1-2 {C.D.
Cal. Apr. 26, 2001) ( finding that Circuit City requires plaintiff to arbitrate claims
under California discrimination statutes). Other district courts have disagreed. See,
e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Banyasz, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16953 at *7 {N.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 2001).
63. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
64. Id. at 88-89. For discussion of Green Tree, see infra notes 76-101 and
accompanying text.

402

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPWYMENT POUCY JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:391

argue that arbitration schemes do not meet this requirement.
The amicus brief filed by a number of employee advocacy
organizations in Circuit City sets forth a series of issues that
may affect the fairness of arbitration including: 1) lack of
voluntary and knowing waivers of their rights by employees;
2) large fees to arbitrate statutory claims which would not be
necessary for judicial enforcement of statutory rights; 3)
limits on relief which prohibit employees from receiving
remedies that would be available in litigation; and 4) unfair
procedures, including shortened statutes of limitations,
discovery restrictions, non-neutral arbitrators, employer freedom to change procedures without notice, and unwritten decisions."' Similarly the D. C. Circuit, in Cole v. Bums International Security Services, 66 and the California Supreme 67
Court,
in Annendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, have
suggested the elements of a fair arbitration procedure for
mandatory employment arbitration. Those elements include:
"(l) a neutral arbitrator; (2) more than minimal discovery; (3)
a written award; (4) full statutory remedies that would
otherwise be available in court; and (5) no burden on the
employee to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators'
68
fees or expenses."
Other related avenues for challenging arbitration exist.
For example, where an ei;nployer imposes an arbitration
agreement unilaterally in an employee handbook, particularly
one that asserts that nothing in the handbook creates a
contract. the employee might argue that no agreement to

65. Circuit City Stores, Inc., Brief of Amici Curiae Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law; NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People; Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund; National Partnership for Women & Families; National
Women's Law Center; and NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of
Respondent,, No. 99-1379, 121 S. Ct. 1302, 1999 U.S. Briefs {Lexis) 1379, at *13-27
{Sept. 19, 2000). One commentator has suggested that where remedies have been
limited in arbitration and the arbitration results in a victory for the employee, the
damages issue might be the subject of a judicial action subsequent to arbitration.
David S. Schwartz, Short-Circuiting Employee Rights: Compelled Arbitration after
Circuit City 18-19 (2001) (manuscript on file with the authors).
66. 105 F.3d 1465 (1997). Cole was authored by Judge Harry Edwards, who was
a well respected labor lawyer and law professor before taking the bench.
67. 6 P.3d 699 (Cal. 2000).
68. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482. See also Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 681-90 (relying on
the Cole requirements).
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arbitrate exists. 69 Additionally. where an agreement lacks
mutuality of obligation. arbitration may not be ordered.
Finally, the arbitration agreement must incorporate the
claims that the employer seeks to compel the employee to
arbitrate." To date, some lower courts have refused to
enforce or have modified arbitration agreements based on one
or more of the above enumerated defects, while others have
declined to do so, permitting arbitration to proceed despite
such provisions. 72 Employers desirous of enforcing arbitration
agreements without litigation should draft them so that
arbitration is as close as possible to the Gilmer Court's
description of an alternative forum which forgoes no
procedural or substantive rights of the employee.'.'
A bill designed to reverse the Circuit City decision was
introduced into Congress in June. The Preservation of Civil
Rights Protections Act would amend the Federal Arbitration
Act so that the only enforceable employment arbitration
agreements are those voluntarily agreed to by both
74
the
employer and the employee after a dispute arises.
While
similar legislation has been introduced in each Congress
since 1994 without enactment, the Circuit Cily ruling may

69. Schwartz. supra note 65, at 12-13 {citing inter alia Ramirez de Arellano v.
American Airlines, 133 F.3d 89 {lst Cir. 1997)).
70. Id. at 13-15 (citing inter alia Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, 211 F.3d

306 (6th Cir. 2000)).
71.
at 29-30.
72. Id.
Compare
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482 (Interpreting arbitration agreement to
require employer to pay all fees) and Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc,, 134
F.3d 1054, 1060, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to require arbitration where large
fees imposed on employee, and Title VII damages not available) with Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1. 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (fee-splltting
provision did not affect enforceability of arbitration agreement). Compare Gannon v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (severing provision limiting
punitive damages while enforcing agreement to arbitrate) with Perez v. Globe Airport
Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2001) (refusing to enforce arbitration
agreement which required employee to waive fees and costs that were statutorily
available in Title VII action). Compare Leonard v. Clear Channel Communications,
1997 WL 581439, at '4 (W.D. Tenn. July 23. 1997) (enforcing unsigned arbitration
agreement contained in employment manual) with Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to enforce agreement where employee
consent was not knowing and voluntary). See also Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173
F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating arbitration agreement because of
unfairness, including exclusive employer control over procedures which the court
described as "utterly lacking in the rudiments of even-handedness").
73. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 30-33.

74. R.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill also permits enforcement of collective

bargaining agreen1ents. Id. at§ 3(b)(2).
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spur civil rights groups to increase the pressure
on Congress
75
to limit mandatory employment arbitration.
2. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph

76

Although Green Tree is a consumer case. it has
significant implications for employment arbitration. Randolph
sued Green Tree. through which she financed the purchase of
her mobile home, for violating the Truth in Lending Act. The
district court dismissed her claim on the basis of the
arbitration agreement in the financing contract, and denied
her request for certification of a class." After concluding that
the dismissal was a final order providing appellate
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, finding that the arbitration agreement did not
provide minimum guarantees that Randolph could vindicate
her statutory rights through arbitration, since the agreement
did not specify the amount and allocation of the arbitral
costs. 78 The Supreme Court faced two issues: the
appealability of the lower court's decision under the FAA, and
the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.
All the justices agreed that an order dismissing all claims
and ordering arbitration is a final order under Section 16(a)(3)
of the FAA. 79 The longstanding interpretation of "final
decision" convinced the court to permit an appeal, although a
number of courts of appeal had declined to permit an appeal
where an .order compelling arbitration was entered in an
"embedded proceeding," i.e., one that "involved
both a request
80
for arbitration and other claims for relief."
On the substantive issue, however, the justices disagreed, with the same five member majority as in Circuit City
voting to reverse the decision of the Eleventh Circuit denying
75. See House Democrats Introduce Legislation to Overturn High Court's Circuit
City Ruling, 17 IND. EMP. Rrs. [BNA), July 10, 2001, at 53.
76. 531 U.S. 79 [2000).
77. 991 F. Supp. 1410 [M.D. Ala. 1998). rev'd, 178 F.3d 1149 [11th Cir. 1999).
affdinpart. rev'dinpart, 531U.S.79 [2000).
78. 178 F.3d 1149 [11th Cir. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 531 U.S. 79
[2000).
79. 531 U.S. at 86, (citing 9 U.S.C. §16(a){3) (stating that "an appeal may be
taken from ... a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this
title.")).
80. Id. at 87.
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arbitration. The majority, in an opinion authored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, concluded that although the plaintiff
argued that she did not have the resources to arbitrate, she
did not meet her burden of establishing that the costs of
arbitration would be prohibitive." The record was silent2
concerning the amount and allocation of arbitral costs.B
Randolph argued that the silence in the arbitration
agreement created a risk that she would be subjected to
prohibitive costs which would cause her to abandon her
claim 83 (which was worth approximately·$15.00 per year
to
84
her and each of the other potential class members).
The
Court recognized that the costs of arbitration might be so
great that they could inlpermissibly interfere with a
consumer's statutory right to vindicate her claim.B' But the
Court placed the burden of demonstrating such costs on
Randolph, the consumer, and found that she had not met
that burden.BB According to the Court, to hold otherwise
87
would interfere with the policy favoring arbitration.
Since
Randolph made no showing regarding costs, the Court did
not specify what sort of evidence might be sufficient to meet
the burden.BB
Justice Ginsburg's partial dissent argued that the Court
should remand for consideration of whether the arbitral
89
forum was accessible to the plaintiff. She drew a distinction
between the adequacy of the arbitral forum and its
accessibility, asserting that prior decisions specified that the
party objecting to arbitration bears the burden of showing its
inadequacy, but not necessarily the inaccessibility.9° Justice
Ginsburg noted that Green Tree, a repeat player in
arbitration, drafted the contract, and therefore could have

"'ty
~1
('ing
81. Id. at 90-91.
82. Id. Randolph submitted limited evidence with respect to average arbitration
fees of the American Arbitriltion Association, but the majority found such evidence

ircuit

,999),

s. 79
lay

be

;o this

plainly insufficient. Id. at 91 n.6.
83. Id. at 90.
84. 991 F. Supp. at 1415.
85. 531 U.S. at 90.
86. Id. at 91-92.
87. Id.at91.
88. Id. at 92.
89. Id. at 93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 93-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer did not join Section II
of the dissent which discusses inadequacy and inaccessibility. Id. at 92.
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specified both the amount and allocation of costs.
Accordingly, it was not clear that the consumer should bear
the burden of showing inaccessibility, but rather than
deciding the question, Justice Ginsburg would have
remanded for evidence of Green Tree's practice regarding
fees. 92
Justice Ginsburg read the majority opinion as
permitting Randolph to return to court after arbitration with
any complaint about cost allocation, noting that the question
then was only the timing of the determination as to whether
the costs were excessive. 93 Accordingly, a remand would be
appropriate. The majority did not reach the question of
whether · arbitral preclusion of class actions barred
enforcement of the arbitration clause because the Eleventh
Circuit did not decide that issue, but the dissent read the
Court's opinion to permit consideration of that issue by the
Eleventh Circuit."
Because Green n-ee was decided under the FAA, its
holding is equally applicable to employment arbitration. The
recognition that an arbitration provision might be so costly to
plaintiffs that the agreement would be unenforceable as an
impermissible intrusion on statutory rights provides promise
for future challenges to arbitration agreements. But the
Court's willingness to enforce an agreement to arbitrate
which is silent on the issue creates difficulties for plaintiffs
malting such challenges. The plaintiff must file a legal action
and initiate discovery to determine costs, without any
guidanc.e from the Court as to what constitutes a sufficient
showing of excessive cost. Alternatively, the plaintiff must
arbitrate and challenge the costs subsequently. The available
remedy at that point, however, would seem to be nothing
more than financial reimbursement for the costs, rather than
the availability of a judicial action.
While the Court did not reach the class action issue, it
promises to resurface in the Court, either in Green n-ee or

another!
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91. Id. at 95-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 96 {Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that there are a
number of arbitration programs that provide low cost arbitration to consumers and
suggested that Green Tree could have specified that arbitration would be conducted
under such a program. Id. at 95 & n.2.
93. Id. at 97 {Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 97, n.4.
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another case. Since many consumer cases and some
employment cases are financially feasible only if brought on a
class basis, the preclusion of class actions
by arbitration may
95
prevent or deter statutory enforcement. Lower courts have
split on the issue of whether to compel arbitration in cases
filed as class actions. 96 Some courts have had no difficulty
ordering arbitration in class action cases despite the protests
of plaintiffs concerned about deprivation of their right to
proceed as a class. 97 In some cases, the courts assumed that
the class claims could be arbitrated, while in others the issue
of whether the arbitration would proceed on ·a class or
98
individual basis was not addressed.
Other courts have
declined to order arbitration in class cases, citing concern
about the impact on class claims and the ability to obtain
effective relief, particularly where individual claims are
small. 99 At least one arbitration provider markets
its rules on
0
the basis that they ptohibit class actions.'°
Since some
companies desiring to avoid class claims seek to preclude
them using arbitration agreements, 10' the Court eventually
will have to determine whether such agreements are
enforceable to prevent class litigation and instead compel
individual arbitration. In addition, courts, and perhaps
eventually the Supreme Court, must determine whether a
class action can proceed in either litigation or arbitration
where the arbitration agreement is silent on the class issue.
These decisions, regardless of the underlying area of law
involved, will have substantial impact on employment law
and litigation.
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95. For a thorough and detailed analysis of class actions and arbitration, see
Jean Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Cl.ass Action, Will the
Cl.ass Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARYL. REV .1 (2000).

96. Id. at 19. 57-62 and cases cited therein.
97. Id. at 60-61 & nn.219-224.
98. Id. at 61-62, 65 and cases cited therein. An arbitration agreement may or
may not address the question of whether class claims can be arbitrated. Id. at 67.
99. Id. at 58-59 and cases cited therein.
100. Id. at 72 ("The National Arbitration Forum has marketed its rules to

corporations in part with the assurance that its rules do not allow for class
actions.").
101. Id. at 5-10.
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B. The Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards

Two arbitration cases. involved challenges to awards by
the losing party, which asked the court to set aside the
decision on public policy grounds in one case and on the
ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the
agreement in the other. While both of these challenges arose
in the labor context, each promises to affect judicial review of
employment arbitration awards.
1. Eastern Associated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of

America

102

Labor arbitration awards under collective bargaining
agreements are enforceable under Section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act. 103 In 1960, the Supreme Court
held that collectively bargained arbitration agreements would
be read with a presumption in favor of arbitrability, as labor
arbitration is a substitute, not for litigation, but for industrial
strife. 104 In addition, the Court held that judicial review of
105
awards was limited for the same reason.
The Court has
held, however, that courts can set aside awards that violate
"well-defined" and "dominant" public policies "ascertained 'by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
00
general considerations of supposed public interests.""
Litigation on public policy issues has often focused on
arbitral reinstatement of employees who 107
commit acts that
could be classified as unlawful or immoral.
· Eastern Associated Coal is a typical case. The arbitrator
reinstated a truck driver who had twice tested positive for
marijuana, subject to a three month suspension, payment of
the arbitration costs, continued participation in a substance

102. 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
103. 29 U.S.C. §185 {1994); see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 451 (1957).
104. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
105. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960).

106. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), (quoting

Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
107. For a review of the case law, see Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law. 16 OHIO ST.
J. DISP. RESOL. 91 (2000).
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abuse program, continued random testing, and a signed,
undated letter of resignation which took effect if the employee
0
tested positive within the following five years.' '
The
employer, citing the Omnibus Transportation Employee
Testing Act of 1991 109 and the implementing Department of
Transportation regulations, 110 asked the court to vacate the
award on public policy grounds.rn The d~strict court, while
recognizing a public policy against performance of safety
sensitive jobs by employees using drugs, found that the
112
award did not violate the policy.
The Fourth Circuit Court
113
of Appeals affirmed the decision in an unpublished opinion.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Fourth Circuit,
with Justice Breyer writing the opinion, and Justice Sea.Lia
filing a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas.
The decision reaffirmed the very narrow scope of the
public policy exception, but refrained from limiting it to
situations where the awatd itself either
violated positive law
114
or required one of the parties to do so.
The Court carefully
examined the Onmibus Transportation Employee Testing Act
and ascertained several relevant public policies, including a
sensitive
policy against drug use by employees in safety
115
positions and a policy in favor of drug testing.
The Court
also found in the Testing Act a policy in favor of rehabilitation
of drug users, and further cited the policy supporting
determination of disciplinary issues by arbitration
where a
110
collective bargaining agreement so provides.
The Court concluded that the policies were not violated
by the award, since it punished the driver, required treatment
and testing, and made clear that he would be terminated
upon another positive test. 117 The Testing Act does not
108. 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
109. Pub. L. No. 102-143, Title V. 105 Stat. 917. 952-65 (1991) (codified at 49

u.s.c. §§ 31306, 31310 (1994)).
110. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 382 (2001).
111. 531 U.S. at63.
112. 66 F. Supp. 2d 796. 805 (S.D. W. Va. 1998), ajfd mem.. 188 F.3d 501 (4tb
3

g

'if
r.

Cir. 1999), ajfd, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
113. 188 F.3d 501 (4tb Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), a.ffd, 531 U.S. 57
(2000).
114.
115.
116.
117.

531 U.S. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.

-~
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require termination of employees who test positive, but leaves
the determination of employment penalty to 118employers,
subject to their collective bargaining agreements.
Nor does
the Act or its regulations specify any particular penalty for
recidivists; indeed the Department of Transportation
considered but rejected a regulation that would have imposed
11
a sixty day driving suspension for two failed drug tests. "
Accordingly, the Court rebuffed the employer's public policy
claim.
The concurrence criticized the majority for failing to limit
the public policy exception to cases where the award violated
or required a party to violate positive law. Justice Scalia
suggested that the Court inappropriately left the door open
for public policy arguments where the award does not violate
positive law, even though the narrow reading of the exception
by the Court left little room for an award that
would violate
0
public policy without violating positive law." Accordingly, in
Justice Scalia's view, leaving open the possibility
did nothing
121
more than create confusion and uncertainty.
This is the second time that the Court has granted
certiorari in a public policy case raising the scope of the
exception. In the first case, the Court did not decide whether
to limit the exception to circumstances where the award
violates positive law; 122 in the instant case the Court agreed
"in principle" that the exception is not so limited, but as
Justice Scalia noted, the Court's analysis indicates that
awards tliat do not violate positive law123
will rarely, if ever, be
overturned for public policy reasons.
Nevertheless, the
·Court's failure to close the door on such cases insures that
employers will continue to assert that reinstatement of
employees by arbitrators violates public policy in cases
involving drugs, alcohol, sexual harassment and similar
118. Id. at 65. The rules did require removal from the safety sensitive position
and completion of drug treatment before return to work. Id. at 64.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. Id. Justice Scalia's opinion also argues against applying the exception in
cases where there is no violation of positive law, indicating that the courts should
not act in such circumstances where the legislature has failed to do so. Id.
122. See United PapeIWorkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 45 n.12

(1987).
123. 531 U.S. at 68.

-
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behavior. Public safety will be invoked to challenge the
finality of arbitration awards with little gained other than
enforcement delay.
Some courts have applied the public policy exception in
employment arbitration cases.""' As employment arbitration
increases and more employees obtain favorable reinstatement
awards, public policy challenges 12 in the employment
arbitration context may grow as well. ' The narrow standard
of review should apply equally in the employment context,
given the deferential posture of the courts in employment
126

arbitration.
12
2. Major League Baseball Players Association v. Garvey '
The Garvey case also arose out of a collective bargaining
agreement and thus, the action for judicial review was
128
brought under Section 301.
The interesting factual
scenario, however, gives '·rise to speculation that it may
indicate the Court's inclinations in arbitration cases outside
the labor context. Garvey was an unsigned per curiam
opinion, decided without briefing or argument, with a short
concurrence by Justice Ginsburg and a dissent by Justice
Stevens.
Garvey arose out of a series of grievances filed. by the
Major League Baseball Players Association against the Major
League Baseball Clubs, alleging that the Clubs had
colluded
12
in the market for free agents in the mid-1980s. ' After the
initial arbitrators found collusion, the Clubs and the
124. See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1995)
(involving contractual just cause provision); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 916 F.
Supp. 638, 643-44 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (involving statutory discrimination claims),
vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 35 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Stephen L. Hayford,
Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30
GA. L. REV. 731, 764 (1996) (noting use of public policy as ground for vacatur of
commercial awards by courts of appeal).
125. While there are grounds for public policy arguments in cases other than
those reinstating employees who have allegedly engaged in improper behavior, the
oveJWhelming majority of the labor cases raising the issue have been discharge
cases. Hodges, supra note 107, at 95-96.
126. For further discussion of the application of the public policy standard in the
employment arbitration context, see Hodges, supra note 107, at 145-55.
127. 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
128. See id. at 509.
129. Id. at 505.
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Association negotiated a settlement agreement which
130
established a fund for players injured by the collusion.
The
Association created a "Framework" for evaluation of players'
claims of damage, which provided that players could obtain
arbitral review of the fund distribution plan. m The
arbitrator's authority was to determine "'only whether the
approved Framework and the criteria set forth therein have
132
been properly applied in the proposed Distribution Plan.'"
Garvey sought arbitration after his claim for damages was
133
rejected by the Association under the Framework.
The
arbitrator denied Garvey's claim, indicating doubt as to the
credibility of the evidence that he offered in support of his
claim. 134 The arbitrator stated that the evidence supporting
the claim, a letter from the San Diego Padres' president and
CEO, contradicted the same individual's testimony in the
earlier arbitration on collusion, and for that reason he
135
rejected the letter.
Although the district court denied Garvey's motion to
vacate the award, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. 136 The Ninth Circuit decided that the arbitrator
'"dispense[d] his own brand of industrial justice"' because the
arbitrator refused to credit Garvey's evidence based on its
conflict with prior testimony that a panel of arbitrators,
chaired by the arbitrator w.ho decided Garvey's case, had
decided was false. 137 Thus, the Ninth Circuit thought the
arbitrator's failure to credit the subsequent testimony was
"inexplicable" and almost "irrational." 138 The Ninth Circuit
139
remanded to the district court to vacate the award, and the
district court remanded to the arbitrator for further
hearing. 140 Garvey again appealed and the Ninth Circuit, in
130. Id. at 506.
131. Id.
132. Id. [quoting Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2000)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 507.
136. 203 F.3d 580, 589 [9th Cir. 2000).
137. Id. at 588 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
138. Id. at 590.
139. Id. at 592.
140. Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 167 L.R.RM. (BNA) 2132

(C.D. Cal. 2000).
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an unpublished decision, stated that its previous decision
had established that the only decision the arbitrator could
make on the evidence was that Ganley was entitled to
damages. 141 Accordingly, the court ordered the district court
to remand the case to the arbitrator with instructions to issue
an award in favor of Garvey."2 On this unusual set of facts,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The opinion began by reiterating the narrow scope of
judicial review, which eschews review on the merits and looks
only to whether the arbitrator is arguably applying the
contract and acting within the scope · of contractual
authority. 143 Arbitral error, regardless of the severity, does
144
not justify overturning the decision.
Because the Ninth
Circuit set aside the award based on its disagreement with
the arbitrator's factual findings on credibility,. the Court
reversed. 145 The Court went on to state that even where a
court properly overturns .. an award on procedural or
substantive grounds. the Court should remand
to the
14
arbitrator rather than decide the dispute itself. ' While the
latter statement is dicta, since the Court found no grounds
for overturning the award, it reflects the current view of the
Court, which is quite deferential to arbitral authority. The
Court did suggest, however, that a decision could be so
irrational as to warrant vacatur on grounds that it was
not
147
within the arbitrator's authority under the agreement.
Justice Ginsburg concurred, briefly indicating that she
agreed that the Ninth Circuit should not have set148aside the
award and that nothing more needed to be said.
Justice
Stevens wrote a longer dissent. Justice Stevens suggested
141. 243 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision}, available at 2000
U.S. App. Lexis 31918, '3. rev'd, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
·
142. Id. at *5.
143. 532 U.S. at 509.
144. Id. at 510.
145. Id. at. 510-11. The Court also indicated that it did not fmd any serious error
in the award, much less inexplicable or irrational error. Id. at 511 n.2.
146. Id. at 511.
147. Id. Specifically, the Court said: "If a remand is appropriate even when the
arbitrator's award has been set aside for 'procedural aberrations' that constitute
'affirmative misconduct,' it follows that a remand ordinarily will be appropriate when
the arbitrator simply made factual findings that the reviewing court perceives as
'irrational.'" Id.

148. Id. at 512 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

,,,,.,,,:,01
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that while the test for judicial review is settled, the cases
provide little guidance regarding the standards to be149 used to
detennine when arbitrators exceed their authority.
Thus,
he would have preferred to hear the case after briefing and
argument, particularly where the Court reached
out
0
unnecessarily to decide the matter of remedy."
In its
present posture, however, Justice Stevens could not agree
with the Court's decision. He noted further that it was
unclear whether the majority held that a court may never
overturn a decision based on a factual error, or whether the
error in the instant case was insufficient to warrant rejection
of the award." 1 If it is the latter, in Justice Stevens'
view, the
152
Court failed to explain its standards or reasoning.
As in Eastern Associated Coal, the Court emphasized the
narrow scope for judicial review. Although the Court treated
Garvey as a labor case under Section 301, the arbitrator's
decision was actually far removed from interpreting the
collective bargaining agreement.
The arbitrator was
interpreting a Framework established by the union for
allocating a settlement fund which resulted from an
arbitration that interpreted the collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, arbitral expertise in interpreting collective
bargaining agreements, a significant part of the rationale for
the judicial deference to the . arbitrator mandated in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, 153 played no role in the case before the
Court. Given the absence of such rationale, the decision may
signal that the Court will give substantial deference to
· arbitral decisions in employment matters where the arbitrator
is interpreting an individual employment contract, an
154
employee handbook, or a statute.
149. Id. {Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 513 n. l (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. {Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) are collectively
known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. The cases articulated the national labor policy
favoring arbitration, including the presumption of arbitrability and judicial deference

toward the arbitrator's decision.
154. See Analysis: Supreme Court Continues Trend of Limiting Review of
Arbitrators' Awards in Rejecting Ruling for Baseball Player, 167 LAB. REL. REP. (ENA),
May 28. 2001. at 105, 108.
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Judicial review might be more searching. however, when
the arbitration involves a statutory rather than a contractual
claim. There has been substantial scholarly debate about the
appropriate scope of review for arbitration awards on
statutory claims. 155 Although scholars have advocated de
nova review of legal issues in arbitral decisions on statutory
claims, 156 most courts have refused to vacate awards on the
basis of an erroneous legal interpretation. Rather, they have
required a showing that the arbitrator acted in "manifest
disregard of the law." 15 ' The latter is a narrow standard,
which has been interpreted by many courts to require a
demonstration that the arbitrator was aware 158of the correct
interpretation of the law but failed to apply it.
While there
are certainly policy reasons for courts to review more
carefully arbitral decisions on statutory claims in order to
insure that statutory objectives are not being undermined,
the Supreme Court's deference to arbitration this term
provides optimism for those who advocate limited judicial
review of all arbitration awards.
C. The Justices and Arbitration

l

Analysis of the positions of the justices in the arbitration
cases reveals several patterns. In the cases involving
enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA, five
justices have consistently voted in favor of enforcement and
four against. Voting in favor of enforcement are Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, who typically
vote against employee interests, and Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, who tend to be less predictable in employment
cases. 159 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens, who
155.

See, e.g.,

RICHARD A. BALES. COMPULSORY ARBlTRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT

IN EMPWYMENT 137 {1997}; Robert N. Covington, Employment ArbiiTati.on After
Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.

d
d

:y
y
ie

;of
,).

345 (1998): Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicfal Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996); Martin H. Malin & Robert
F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trllogy to Gilmer; 44 HASTINGS L.J.
1187 (1993).
156. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 155, at 1238, 1240.
157. See BALES, supra note 155, at 136; Hayford, supra note 1$5, at 474.
158. See BALES, supra note 155, at 136.
159. See Ann C. Hodges & Douglas D. Scherer, The Employment Law Decisions of
the October 1999 Tenn of the Supreme Court: A Review and Analysis, 4 EMPLOYEE
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typically vote to protect employee interests, have been
reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements imposed on
employees and consumers with little bargaining power.
Where the arbitration agreement is negotiated by a union,
however, providing more power to the employees, all of the
justices have been willing to defer to the arbitrator's decision
in post-arbitral judicial review. The one exception was
Justice Stevens in Garvey, but he argued only that the Court
should have had briefing and argument before deciding
whether to enforce the award.
1. EEOC v. Waffle House

The Court has granted certiorari in the case of EEOC v.
WajJle House, '°0 a Fourth Circuit decision dealing with the

impact of an arbitration agreement on the EEOC's ability to
seek individual relief. The employee in WajJle House signed
an application for employment requiring him 161
to arbitrate any
dispute or claim concerning his employment. When he was
terminated from his position of grill operator after suffering
two seizures, he filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that
162
his discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The EEOC filed an enforcement action against the employer.
In response, the employer asked the court to compel
arbitration pursuant to the employee's agreement on the
163
application, and either stay or dismiss the court action.
The district court denied arbitration on the ground that the
employee's application, and therefore the arbitration
agreement, had been filed at a facility other than the one at
which he was hired. 164 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, and
went on to analyze whether the arbitration agreement affected
165
the EEOC's action.
The court began by recognizing that the ADA contains a
"dual enforcement system" which gives rights to individuals

Rrs. &EMPWYMENTPOL'YJ. 177, 179 (2000).
160. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999). cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001).
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 807.
rd.
Id. at 808.
Id.
Id. at 808-09.
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and the EEOC. 166 Thus, the EEOC has an independent right
and duty to enforce the statute, acting in the public interest
rather than the interest of any individual affected by
discrimination. 167 The Supreme Court indicated in Gilmer v.
168
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
that an arbitration agreement does not prevent an employee from filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, and stated that arbitration
agreements "will not preclude the EEOC from
bringing
169
actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief."
Relying on
Gilmer, and the statutory provisions authorizing independent
EEOC actions, the court decided that the EEOC could not be
compelled to arbitrate pursuant to an employee's arbitration
agreement. 110 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the.
policy favoring arbitration barred the EEOC from seeking
171
individual relief for the employee.
The EEOC could,
however, seek both affirmative and negative injunctive relief
barring discrimination on the basis of disability and requiring
the employer to establish policies to provide equal
employ112
ment opportunities for individuals with disabilities.
Prior to the Waffle House decision, the Sixth Circuit and
the Second Circuit had addressed the effect of individual
arbitration agreements on the EEOC's authority to sue. In
3
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody, Inc., 17 an Age Discrimination in
174
Employment Act (ADEA) case, the Second Circuit held that
an arbitration agreement precluded the EEOC from seeking
monetary relief on behalf of a charging party. but not broad
injunctive relief. Because the case sought only monetary
damages, it was dismissed. 175 In EEOC v. Frank's Nursery &
Crafts, Inc., 116 the Sixth Circuit found the EEOC's suit

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
1 71.

Id. at810-ll.
Id. at 811.
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
Id. at 32, quoted in Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811.
Waffie House, 193 F.3d at 811.

Id. at 812-13 (barring the EEOC from proceeding in court seeking back pay,
reinstatement, compensatory or punitive damages for the employee).
172. Id. at 812-13. Judge King dissented, agreeing with the district court that
there was no agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 813-14 {King, J., dissenting).
173.
174.
175.
176.

156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
29 u.s.c. §§ 621-34 (1994).
156 F.3d at 301-03.
177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
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unaffected by an individual's arbitration agreement."' The
circuit split led to the grant of certiorari.
The majority in Frank's Nursery wrote a lengthy opinion
supporting its decision. 178 Like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit analyzed the statute, legislative history and prior
decisions, concluding that charging parties and the EEOC
179
have separate and independent causes of action.
The
charging party's agreement to arbitrate could not bind the
EEOC, which was not a party to the arbitration agreement,
nor did the agreement waive the EEOC's independent right to
180
litigate, which attached once the charge was filed.
The
independence of the claim, and the EEOC's broader public
interest, convinced the Sixth Circuit to permit the EEOC to
recover damages for the individual despite the arbitration
agreement. 181 The court concluded that the doctrines of
preclusion, election of remedies and waiver did not bar the
182
EEOC's claim for relieffor the individual.
The Second Circuit in Kidder, Peabody analogized the
case to an individual's settlement or waiver of her claim,
which precludes the EEOC from seeking relief on her
behalf. 183 The Sixth Circuit, however, determined that,
because the individual did not control the EEOC's decision of
whether to litigate, the individual could not deprive the EEOC
184
of its authority by agreeing t<;> arbitrate.
The court further
noted that allowing individual agreements to limit the agency
to injunctive relief would interfere with the EEOC's ability to
enforce' the statute in the public interest, particularly where
the Supreme Court has stated that monetary relief is

177. Id. at 455.
178. Id. at 452-68 A dissent by Judge Nelson agreed with the Second Circuit's
opinion in EEOC v._. Kid<!er, Peabody that the EEOC could sue for injunctive relief,
but not private remedies· for the individual. Id. at 470-71 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 454.
180. Id. at 455. Although the underlying claim in Frank's Nursery & Crafts was a
Title VII claim and tile claim in Wajfle House an ADA claim, the procedures under
the two statutes, and the EEOC's role, are the same because the ADA adopted and
incorporated the enforcement procedures of Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
(1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9 (1994).
181. 177 F.3d at 466.
182. Id. at 467.
183. Kidder Peabody, 156 F.3d at 302-03.
184. 177F.3dat470.
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essential to statutory enforcement.
The court responded to
the argument that allowing the EEOC to sue for individual
damages would permit charging parties to avoid arbitration
agreements, noting that the individual has no control over
EEOC decisions to sue, and given the EEOC's limited
litigation resources, most individuals with arbitration
186
agreements can not avoid them by filing an EEOC charge.
This case poses for the Court a choice between enforcing
an arbitration agreement to the point of preventing an
employee from any judicial recovery on a claim subject to
arbitration and recognizing the EEOC's statutory authority to
proceed in the public interest even where it means seeking a
judicial remedy for an employee who has agreed to arbitrate.
The EEOC has a strong statutory argument, particularly in
light of amendments to Title VII in 1972 and 1991, both of
which granted the agency authority to pursue relief for
individuals and expressly indicated that such relief was in the
public interest. 187 While the Fourth Circuit's decision leaves
the agency free to seek "broad injunctive relief," it is not clear
precisely what that is and whether it would be available188in a
case involving an individual instance of discrimination.
In
addition, preclusion of individual relief may discourage
employees with arbitration agreements from filing charges,
diluting the EEOC's ability to enforce the statute even with
broad injunctive relief, as the agency is unlikely
to be aware
189
of discrimination if no charges are filed.
If employers are
successful in limiting the EEOC's ability to obtain individual
relief for employees and in precluding class action claims
using arbitration agreements, the effective enforcement of
185. Id. at 466 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).

lt's
ief,

8a
der
md
7(a)

186. Id. at 468.
187. See Waffie House, Inc., Brief for Petitioner, No. 9'9-1$23, 122 S. Ct. 754
(2002), 2001 WL 603394 at '17 (May 25, 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e·5(a),
2000e·5lnlll (1994): 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1) & (a)(2) (1994)): id. at '28-29.
188. Waffle House argued that broad relief was unavailable for that reason, but
the Court did not decide the issue, leaving it to the district court on remand. 193
F.3d at 813 n.3.
189. See Waffle House, Brief of the States of Missouri, Alaska, AriZona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands In Support of Petitioner,
No. 99·1823, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002), 2001 WL 575440, at '8·9 (May 25, 2001).

420

EMPWYEE RIGmS AND EMPWYMENT POLICY JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:391

employment discrimination statutes will be severely
undermined. The potential impact of the decision is far
broader than discrimination claims, as it could limit the
ability of federal and state agencies with enforcement
190
authority under various statutes to seek individual relief.
If
the EEOC can persuade one or more of the five justices that
strongly favor enforcement of arbitration agreements that the
statutory language and clear congressional intent permit the
agency to seek individual relief, the agency may prevail.
Although Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are typically the
swing votes, the statutory language argument may convince
Justices Scalia and Thomas to rule in favor of the EEOC. The
judicial momentum favoring arbitration is strong, however,
191
and may carry the day in Walfle House as well.
Ill. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

A. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff - The Court Addresses ERISA

Preemption

Like arbitration issues in recent years, ERISA preemption
192
issues have provided much fodder for the Court.
The most
190. See id. at -*4-5, *12-13 (noting various statutes that would be affected
including civil rights laws, such as employment discrimination and fair housing
laws, and consumer protections laws). Many federal statutes have anti-retaliation
provisions enforced by agencies that might be affected as well. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §
215 (a){3) (1994) {prohibiting discrimination against any employee for exercising
rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act): Id.§ 660(c}(l)(prohibiting discrimination
'against any employee for exercising rtghts under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act).

191. Editor's Note. On January 15, 2002, the Supreme Court decided EEOC v.
Waifle House, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002). The Court held that EEOC may seek individual
remedies for a victim of employment discrimination, even though the victim signed a
binding arbitration agreement that covers employment disputes. The Court held
that "the EEOC has authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless of the forum
that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their dispute." 122 S. Ct. at
765. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
192. As in the case of arbitration, the Court has already granted certiorari in a
preemption case for next term. See Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d
959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001). Moran involves an Illinois
law that requires health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") to provide for
independent review by a physician where the primary care physician and the HMO
disagree about the medical necessity of a treatment. Id. at 968. If the independent
physician deems the treatment medically necessary, the law requires the HMO to
provide it. Id. The Seventh Circuit panel found that the law was saved from

20011
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recent preemption case, Egelhoff v. Egelho.ff, dealt with a
Washington state statute which provided that upon divorce,
designation of a spouse as a beneficiary
of a non-probate
194
asset was revoked automatically.
Two lawsuits were
initiated in state court by the children of a deceased man to
recover the proceeds of his life insurance policy and the
benefits of his pension plan, both of which designated his
former wife as beneficiary. 195 Although the trial courts ruled
that the state statute revoking the beneficiary designation
was preempted by ERISA, both the state court of appeals,
after consolidating the cases, and the Washington
Supreme
196
Court held that the statute was not preempted.
Justice Thomas' majority opm10n reversing the
Washington Supreme Court was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
and Ginsburg. The opinion recognized the breadth of ERISA's
preemption provision, !Jut noted that it cannot be read
literally because preemption of all statutes that "relate to" any
employee benefit plan could nullify virtually all state
legislation. 197 Relying on more recent decisions which read
the scope of ERISA preemption more narrowly, Justice
Thomas indicated that the Court must look to the purpose of
ERISA and the effect of the state law on ERISA plans to
determine whether Congress intended to preempt the state
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preemption by the insurance savings clause of ERISA because it regulated
insurance. Id. at 969-70 (citing 29U.S.C.§l144(b)(2)(A) (1994)). Further, the panel
concluded, contrary to the Fifth Circuit in Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't
of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000). that the state law did not conflict with ER!SA
because the Illinois statute required incorporation of the review provision into the
plan and thus a suit for enforcement of the state law was nothing more than a suit
under ERISA to enforce the plan. 230 F.3d 970-71. Judge Posner, dissenting from
the denial of a petition for rehearing en bane, argued that if the law is incorporated
into the plan, then the law is regulating the plan, not merely insurance, and
therefore should be preempted. Id.. at 974 (Posner, C.J., dissenting). The Seventh
Circuit's decision permits state law regulation of benefits decisions by insurance
plans and will undermine the goal of plan uniformity. Yet it applies to all HMOs
regardless of whether they provide benefits under an ERISA plan. The Supreme
Court's decision in Moran will further define the scope and application of the
preemption provision and the insurance savings clause of ERISA.
193. 121 S. Ct. 1322 (2001).
194. Id. at 1324.
195.
Id. re Estate of Egelhoff, 968 P.2d 924 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), ajfd, 989 P.2d
196. In
80 (Wash. 1999), rev'dsub nom. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff. 121 S. Ct. 1322 (2001).
197. 121 S. Ct. at 1324-25.
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law. 198 Because the state statute directed ERISA plan
administrators to pay benefits in accordance with state law
rather than the plan, the connection between the state
law
199
and ERISA plans was one that required preemption.
The
statute dealt with a core aspect of plan administration,
payment of benefits, and interfered with a central purpose of
ERISA, providing uniform national standards for benefit
plans. 200 Thus, the statute imposed a burden on
administrators of ERISA plans to determine which state law
might apply and affect designation of beneficiary 201status,
rather than simply complying with the plan itself.
Tbe
majority concluded that the state law directly conflicted with
ERISA, which requires administrators to pay benefits in
202
accordance with plan requirements.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented,
20
finding no direct conflict between ERISA and the state law. '
Justice Breyer read the Washington statute as providing a
default rule, which applied only where the plan did not
provide otherwise. 204 He noted that the plans at issue said
nothing about the validity of a beneficiary designation, except
for recognizing that a designation might become invalid, and
205
thus it made sense for state inheritance law to fill the gaps.
There is a presumption against preemption where,206 as here,
the law is' in an area of traditional state regulation.
Justice
Breyer viewed the burden of administration imposed by the
statute to be minimal, and saw the state statute as consistent

198. Id. at 1331.
199. Id. at 1332.
200. Id. at 1325.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1329. The ability of plan administrators to opt out of the state law with
specific plan language did not save the statute from preemption, because plan
administrators still would have to ascertain all state laws, monitor state laws for
changes, and tailor and modify plans in accordance with state law. Id.
203. Id. at 1331-35 {Breyer J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote a brief concurrence in which Justice Ginsburg joined, agreeing that the direct conflict between
ERISA and the state law triggered preemption, but noting uncertainty as to what else
might be preempted. Id. at 1330 {Scalia, J., concurring). He noted that, in his view,
ERISA preemption must be interpreted in accord with "ordinary pre-emption

jurisprudence." Id. at 1331.
204. Id. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id.

I
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207

with ERISA's goal of protecting employee benefits.
Accordingly, since he found no conflict and no preemption of
the field, and the state statute did not prevent the
accomplishment of any federal objective, Justice Breyer
would find no preemption."'
While the majoriiy saw the state statute as conflicting
with ERISA's requirement that plan administrators follow
plan documents,'0 ' the dissent viewed the state statute as
merely filling in the gaps in the plan where terms were
not
210
defined or beneficiary designations were not clear.
The
state statute's involvement with probate and family law, areas
of traditional state regulation, might have presaged a decision
upholding the state law, but the potential for conflicting
obligations for plan administrators regarding payment of
benefits convinced the majoriiy to preempt the statute.
There are other state statutes that similarly impact plan
administration. An example cited in the opinion is slayer
statutes, laws that bar murderers from inheriting from
their
211
victims and thereby benefitting from their crtmes.
While
the majoriiy did not decide the issue, it suggested that the
state slayer laws and their underlying principle are virtually
uniform and longstanding, perhaps minimizing their
interference with ERISA's aims. 212 Justice Breyer, on the
other hand, pointed out the differences in state slayer
statutes, particularly with respect to proof, and noted that
unlike the divorce revocation ·statute, "few, if any, slayer
statutes permit plans to opt out of the state properiy law
rule." 213 The petitioner, arguing in favor of preemption of the
divorce revocation statute, distinguished the slayer statutes,
suggesting that they were so uniform and well-settled at the
time of ERISA's passage that they were incorporated into

207. Id. at 1334 (noting that it was likely that the plan participant would have
preferred that the benefits go to the children).
208. Id. at 1335.
209. See 29 U.S.C. § Jl32(a)(l)(B) (1994) (authorizing plan participants and

beneficiaries to sue to enforce the terms of pension and benefit plans covered by
ERJSA).

210.
21 !.
212.
213.

121 S. Ct. at 1331 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1334 (Breyer, J., dissenting}.

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPWYMENT POUCY JOURNAL [Vol. 5:391

424

ERISA as federal common law. 21 " Other statutes that might be
affected by the decision include simultaneous death statutes
and statutes defining death, spouse and child for purposes of
inheritance."'
Like the Court's earlier preemption decisions, the
decision provides no clear line or test to determine ERISA
preemption issues. Discerning the preemptive intent of
Congress, and separating those instances where preemption
was intended from the vast number of statutes that "relate to"
employee benefit plans, is a daunting task. It seems likely
that case by case analysis will continue to prevail in this
area, and that ERISA preemption issues will provide fuel for
Supreme Court cases for years to come.
B. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.
The Court will revisit employee benefits during the
October 2001 Term in Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide,
Inc."' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
validity of the Department of Labor's regulation requiring
covered employers to designate Family Medical Leave Act
("FMLA") leave at the time it is granted, and precluding
employers from later counting undesignated leave against
the
217
employee's statutory twelve week leave entitlement.
The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
regulation was invalid because it "directly contradict[edl the
statute by increasing the amount of leave that an employer
218

must provide."
ln. the case at issue, Ragsdale became ill with219 cancer
before she had worked for the employer for one year.
Since
214. Id. (making the argument with respect to the slayer rule and also suggesting
that the simultaneous death rule might be similarly incorporated).
215. Transcript of Oral Argument, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 121 S. Ct. 1322, No. 991529, 2000 U.S. Trans. {Lexis) 68, at *2-5 {Nov. 8, 2000): see also Brief of tlle States
of Washington, Arkansas, Colorado, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah,
Vermont, and West Virginia, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 1999 U.S.
Briefs (Lexis) 1529, at '14 (Sept. 18, 2000).
216. 218 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2000). cert. granted. 121 S. Ct. 2548 (2001).
217. The regulation invalidated by the Court of Appeals is found at 29 C.F.R. §
825.700(a) (2001).
218. 218 F.3d at 940.
219. All of the facts are taken from the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 218 F.3d
933.
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she had not worked for one year, she was not yet eligible for
FMLA leave, but was entitled to leave under the employer's
plan. Pursuant to that plan she was granted seven months of
leave in thirty day increments. She was terminated for
exhausting her leave, and since she was still unable to work,
she requested FMLA leave. The employer informed her that
she had exhausted all of her leave, and denied her request to
work on a reduced hour schedule. Several months later, she
was released to work and returned to full time work at
another employer. Ragsdale's FMLA claim was based on the
regulation. She contended that since the employer did not
designate her prior leave as FMLA leave, she remained
entitled to FMLA leave after she exhausted the leave available

g
,_
s
1,

under the employer's plan.
If, as the court of appeals concluded, the regulation
contradicts the statute, then it must be invalidated under
Chevron. 220 The court's rationale is based on the intent of
Congress to provide twelve weeks of leave as a minimum
labor standard, designed to balance the needs of employers
and employees. 221 Since the regulations require employers to
provide additional leave under some circumstances, the court
found them inconsistent with the statute. In addition, the
court noted that Congress incorporated explicit notice
provisions with specified penalties elsewhere in the statute,
and thus its failure to do so here indicates a lack
of intent,
222
which the administrative agency carinot override. The court
acknowledged, however, that a regulation requiring
contemporaneous designation of FMLA leave under some
circumstances might be valid, giving the example of an
employee whose rights were denied because she could have
returned to work after twelve weeks but failed to do so
because she was not notified that the leave was FMLA
leave."23 Amici for the employer argued that the regulation
discourages employers from providing leave in excess of the
FMLA entitlement for fear that it would be used to extend
leave, rather than to coincide with FMLA leave and allow

l.

220. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
§

Id

U.S. 837 (1984).
221. 218 F.3d at 939.
222. Id. at 938-39.
223. Id. at 939-40.
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22

employees to receive payment. '
The regulation does not mandate more than twelve weeks
of leave, however, unless the employer fails to designate leave
as FMLA leave. Since the statute does not specify when
FMLA leave begins or how employers and employees
communicate their intent to substitute paid employer leave
for unpaid FMLA leave, 22 ' the regulation can be read as filling
226
gaps left by the statute rather than contradicting it.
Moreover, it is designed to effectuate the statute by requiring
that employees be given notice of their rights, thereby
enabling employees to plan an appropriate balance of family
and work obligations. 22 ' Under this reading, the regulation
would be upheld as a permissible agency interpretation
228
designed to fill a gap in the statute.
Given these two divergent readings of the regulation, the
Court is likely to break down along familiar lines, with the
justices traditionally favoring employer interests finding the
regulation invalid and those favoring employee interests
voting to uphold the regulation. 220 As in many cases, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor, the swing votes, are likely to
determine the outcome.
224. Brief Arptci Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, LPA, Inc.,and
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Support of Respondent, 2000 U.S.
Briefs (Lexis) 6029, at '15-18 (Oct. 5, 2001).
225. The statute permits such substitution at the request of either party. 29
U.S.C.§ 2602(d)(2)(A) (1994).
226. See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Associaiton,

, AARP, Equal Rights Advocates, the Legal Aid Society-Employment Law Center,
National Depressive and Manic-Depressive Association, and the National Women's
Law Center in Support of Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs Lexis 6029, at *8-10 {Sept. 7,

2001).
227. Id; at *8-13; Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs {Lexis) 6029 at *16-17 {Sept. 7, 2001). If the employer
could retroactively designate leave, there would be little incentive to comply with
notice requirements and _there would be a risk of leave manipulation by the
employer. Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations and the National Partnership for Women and Families as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, 2000 U.S. Briefs {Lexis) 6029, at *18-19 {Sept. 7, 2001}
(arguing that the categorical rule selected by the Secretary of Labor best effectuates
the statutory purpose as contrasted with the suggestion of the court of appeals that
retroactive designation be prohibited only where the employee demonstrates a
material detriment).
228. See Chevfon, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
229. See Hodges & Scherer, supra note 159, at 179 (noting that Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas consistently favor employer interests,
and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens generally support employee
interests),
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IV. LIMITING PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES DEVELOPMENTS

A. Board ofTrustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) 230 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
disability by state and local governments, 231and by private
sector employers with 15 or more employees.
Together with
other provisions of the ADA, Title I seeks to accomplish the
congressional purpose of "[providing] a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of.
232
discrimination against individuals with disabilities[.)"
The
principal Title I enforcement mechanism consists ·of federal
court actions brought by individuals alleging disability
discrimination, following investigation of discrimination
233
charges filed by these individuals with the EEOC.
In Board of Trustees of the .University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 234 the Supreme Court concluded that this enforcement mechanism, as applied to state government employers,
violates the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.· The
Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
235
Subjects of any Foreign State." . The Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a private action in federal court if the state has
consented to being sued, and Congress may abrogate the
states' immunity from suit if it "unequivocally intends to do
230. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
231. The ADA defines "employer" as "a pers0:n engag~d in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person ... ," Id. § 12111(5}(A). The term "employer" includes state and local
governments, but is subject to exceptions for the federal government, Indian tribes,
and bona fide private membership clubs. Id.§ 121l1(5)(B).
232. Id§ 12101 (b)(l).
233. Under Title I, persons alleging disability discrimination in employment must
file charges with the EEOC, and must obtain a notice of right to sue from the EEOC
as a prerequisite to filing a federal court action.
234. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
235. U. S. CONST. amend. XI.
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so and 'acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional
authority. "' 236
In Fitzpabick v. Bitzer, 237 the Court held that Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Arnendment238 gives Congress power to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity from suit by private
individuals alleging employment discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 239 Subsequent cases
established that Congress' enforcement power under Section
5 goes beyond prohibiting conduct that violates the Equal
Protection Clause, and extends to "prohibiting a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself
2 0
forbidden by the Amendment's text." '
Fitzpabick supported congressional efforts to combat
discrimination by state govermnent employers on the grounds
of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Intentional
discrimination based upon any of these categories, each of
which is listed in Title VII, also would violate the Equal
Protection Clause, unless the classification in question
241
survives heightened judicial scrutiny.
Garrett, on the other
hand, involves discrimination on the basis of disability, a
236. 531 U.S. at 363 (quoting Kimel v. Flortda Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73
(2000)). Garrett is the latest in a recent series of Eleventh Amendment cases that
have focused On the power of Congress to create private party causes of action
against_states. This subject will be revisited by the Court in its October 2001 Term
consideration of Raygor v. Regents of University ofMtnnesota, 620 N.W.2d 680 (Minn.
2001), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2214 (2001). Raygor involves the constitutionality,
under the Eleventh Amendment, of 28 U.S.C. §1367(d), a federal supplemental
jurisdiction statute that tolls the running of state statutes of limitations for state law
" claims (including employment law claims) pending in federal court.
237. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
238. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Section 5 provides: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l to 2000e-17 (1994).
240. Kimel v. Flortda Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) (quoting City of
Boernev. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 {1997)).
241. Strict scrutiny applies to classifications based upon race, national origin, and
religion, which means that a government defendant must prove that the
classification serves a compelling government purpose, and that the means used are
narrowly tailored. to achieve that purpose. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[Racial] classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests."). Middle-tier scrutiny applies to classifications based upon gender, which
means that a government defendant must prove that the classification "[s]erves
important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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category that has not been subjected to heightened
judicial
2 2
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. ' Similarly, last
term's decision by the Court in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents2' ' involved age discriminatio.n, another category that
does not receive heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 244 In Kimel, the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment prevents private individuals from
bringing actions in federal court against state defendants
under the ADEA.
The distinguishing case between Fitzgerald, invo.lving
race discrimination under Title VII, and Garrett and Kimel,
involving disability discrimination under the ADA and age
discrimination under the ADEA, respectively, is City ofBoeme
v. Flores. 245 City of Boerne, a 1997 decision, considered the
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA). 246 RFRA provided that government may not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even by a
rule of general applicability, unless "the government can
demonstrate the burden '(l) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of
247
furthering that compelling government interest. "' The Court
considered whether Congress had the power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact RFRA. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
242. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Uving Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 437 {1985), the
Court determined that governmental discrimination on the basis of mental
retardation is subject to rational basis scrutiny. The Court held that "[t}o withstand
equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded
and others must be rationally related to a legitimate gov~mmental purpose." Id. at
446.
243. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

244. The Court applies rational basis scrutiny to disability and age classifications,

which means that a party challenging the classification must prove that there is no
rational connection between the classification and achievement of a legitimate
governmental objective. The Court expressed this in .Ktmel as follows: "States may
discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteehth Amendment if the
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id.
at 83. The Court previously applied rational basis scrutiny to age classifications in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 {1991} (mandatory re1;irement of state court judges
at the age of 70}, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 301 (1976}
(mandatory retirement of state police officers at the age of 50}, and Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (1973} (mandatory retirement of foreign service ·officers at age 60).
245. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
246. Pub. L. No. 103-41, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l
to 4 (1994)).
247. 521 U.S. at 515-6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l).
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persons from violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, 248 but the definition of violation under
RFRA is far more stringent than the constitutional test. In
City of Boerne, the Court articulated the doctrine that it later
applied in Garrett and Kimel. For an exercise by Congress of
Section 5 power to be valid, "[t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
249
remedied and the means adopted to that end."
This means
that "[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
response to another.... "250 In City of Boerne, congruence
and proportionality were absent because the RFRA statutory
prohibition far exceeded the scope of governmental 251
action
that would violate the Free Exercise of Religion Clause.
Therefore, the Section 5 remedial power of Congress is
dependent upon there being a constitutional violation to be
remedied, and the means chosen by Congress must be
congruent with, and proportional to, the violation to be
remedied and prevented. Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
these requirements as follows: "[I]n order to authorize private
individuals to recover money damages against the States,
there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which
violates the Fourteenth Amenqment, and the remedy imposed
by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the
targeteq violation." 252 The majority and dissenting opinions in
Garrett accepted these dual principles, but disagreed about
the amount of deference the Court should give to
congressional fact-finding.
Patricia Garrett worked as a Director of Nursing for the
University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. She alleged
that the University violated Title I of the ADA by
discriminating against her because of her breast cancer.
248. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

249. 521 U.S. at at 520.
250. Id. at 530 (citation omitted).
251. In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
the Court held that the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment is
not violated by a "valid and neutral law of general applicability." 494 U.S. at 879
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 {1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
252. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
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Milton Ash, who worked as a security officer for the Alabama
Department of Youth Services, alleged that his employer
refused to accommodate his asthma and sleep apnea in
violation of Title I. In a combined decision, the district court
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on
253
Eleventh Amendment grounds,
and the Eleventh Circuit
254
Court of Appeals reversed.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court.in Garrett
was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas. Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The majority and dissenting
opinions disagreed sharply over the extent to which the
congressional record revealed a pattern of unconstitutional
disability-based discrimination in employment by the states.
Because disability classifications are subject to rational basis
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the Constitution
is violated only by governwental action that lacks a rational
connection to achievement of a legitimate · governmental
interest. 255 Thus, the majority and dissenting opinions differed
over whether the employment practices of the states involved
a pattern of irrational exclusion and discrimination.
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he legislative
record of the ADA ... simply fails to show that Congress did
in fact identify a pattern of irrational
state discrimination in
256
employment against the disabled."
Although the .record
revealed instances of failure by states to accommodate
disabled people, "[w]hether they were irrational ...is more
debatable." 257 Chief Justice Rehnquist continued, "But even if
it were to be determined that eac.h incident upon fuller
examination showed unconstitutional action .on the part of
the State, these incidents taken together fall far short of even
suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination on
258
which§ 5 legislation must be based."
253. Garrett v. Board of Trustees of Alabama in Birmingham and Ash v. Alabama
Department of Youth Services, 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala. 1998), reu'd, 193 F.3d
1214 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
254. Garrett v. Board of Trustees of Alabama in Birminghani. 193 F.3d 1214 {1 lth

0),
. is

,79
J ..

Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) .
255. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
256. 531 U.S. at 368.
257.
370.
258. Id.
Id. at
The
concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor,
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The dissent criticized the majority for "[r]eviewing the
congressional record as if it were an administrative record. "259
The dissent concluded:
To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted
Congress' legislative power is to stand the underlying
principle - a principle of judicial restraint - on its head.
But without the use of this burden of proof rule or some
other unusually stringent standard of review, it is difficult
to see how the Court .can find the legislative record here
inadequate. Read with a reasonably favorable eye, the
record indicates that state govermnents subjected those
260
with disabilities to seriously adverse, disparate treatment.

The majority applied the Boerne congruence and
proportionality test to the ADA prohibition against disparate
impact discrimination261 and ADA obligation to reasonably
also concluded that a pattern of unconstitutional state conduct had not been
established:
The predicate for money damages against an unconsenting State in suits
brought by private persons must be a federal statute enacted upon tile
documentation of patterns of constitutional violations committed by the
State in its official capacity. That predicate, for reasons discussed here and
in the decision of the Court, has not been established.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
259. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote: "In reviewing§ 5 legislation,
we have never required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence
that the Court appears to contemplate .... Nor has the Court traditionally required
Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down the record
evidence, category by category." Id. at 380 {Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
also referred to "roughly 300 examples·· of discrimination by state governments
themselves in the legislative record." Id. at 379. He wrote, "I fail to see how this
evidence 'falls far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based."' Id
260. Id at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). An example of the information available to
Congress was provided by the Solicitor General;
[W]hile the Disabilities Act was before Congress, the Advisory Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations {ACIR) {consisting of six Members of Congress
and eleven representatives of state and local governments] smveyed state
compliance with prohibitions on employment disclimination and reported
that 350/o of responding state and local governments had no employees with
disabilities, and half had only "one or two." ACIR, Disability Rights
Mandates 64 (1989). Further, 82°/o of state and local government employers
harbored moderate to strong negative attitudes and misconceptions about
hiring persons with disabilities, based on stereotypes, prejudice, and
"feelings of discomfort in associating with disabled individuals."
Garrett, Brief for the United States, No. 99-1240, 531 U.S. 356, 1999 U.S. Briefs
(Lexis) 1240 at •33.34 (Aug. 11, 2000).
261. The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual .... "
42 U.S.C.§ 12112{a) (1994). The ADA defines "discriminate" to include "utilizing
standards, criteria, or methods of administration - (A) that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability . . . . " Id. § 12112 (b)(3), and "using
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen-out an individual with a disability ... unless the standard, test, or
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accommodate disabled persons, 262 and concluded, "Even were
it possible to squeeze out of these examples a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and
remedies created by the ADA against the States would raise
the same sort of concerns as to congruence
and
263
proportionality as were found in City of Boerne ... ,"
The dissent found sufficient evidence of irrational
employment discrimination by states against disabled
persons, and concluded that Congress acted within its
Section 5 power when it prohibited state government
disparate impact discrimination and required state
government employers to reasonably accommodate disabled
employees and applicants for employment. Justice Breyer .
wrote, "The Court suggests that the Act's 'reasonable
accommodation' requirement and disparate-impact. standard
'far exceed what is constitutionally required.' But we. have
upheld disparate impact standards in contexts )Where they
264
were not 'constitutionally required."
Where does Garrett leave disabled persons who are
discriminated against by their state government employers, or
prospective employers? First, Garrett blocks federal court
ADA Title I actions by private individuals only if the state is
the employer. Garrett does not block suit "against a municipal
corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm
of the State." 265 Eleventh Amendment sovereign266immunity
"bars suits against States but not lesser entities."
Second,
although federal court ADA Title I actions seeking money
damages may not be brought against states by private
individuals, the Justice Department may bring ADA Title I
enforcement actions. 267 Third, private individuals may seek
other selection criteria . , . is shown to be job-related for the position in question and
is consistent with business, necessity . ... " Id.§ 12112 (b}(6).
262. The ADA defines "discriminate" to include "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity(.]" Id. §
12112(b)(5)(A).
263. 531 U.S. at 372.
264. Id. at 385 {citations omitted) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
266. Id.
267. For enforcement purposes, Title I of the ADA borrows the "powers, remedies,
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prospective injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex parte
Young, 2 ' ' under which a state official may be subjected to a
personal action in federal court requiring that he or she
comply with the Constitution or a federal statute.
Fourth, an individual may bring an action in state court
under an applicable state statute that prohibits employment
discrimination by the state on the basis of disability. Fifth,
private individuals may bring ADA Title I actions against a
state that has consented to suit. For example, Minnesota
recently waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
269
under the ADA and other federal employment statutes.
Sixth, Congress could require states to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit under the ADA as a
precondition to receipt of federal funds. A bill now is pending
before the U. S. Senate that would require states to waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADEA actions as a pre70
condition to receipt of federal funds.' The constitutionality
and procedures" set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) (1994). Title VII gives authority to the Attorney General to bring actions
against "a government, government agency, or political subdivision." Id. § 2000e5(f){l). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal court actions against a state
brought by the federal government.
268. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
269. Minnesota Responds to Garrett Decision, Other States Consider Waiving
Irrununiiy to ADA Lawsuits, 167 LAB. REL. REP. {BNA), June 25, 2001, at 233.
270. On May 22, 2001, Senator Jeffords introduced Senate Bill 928, which
provides for a limited waiver by state_s of their sovereign immunity from suit under
the ADEA. 147 Cong. Rec. S5441-0l, S5458 (2001). The bill is co-sponsored by
Senators Kennedy and Feingold, and provides as follows, in Sections 7 and 8:
(7) The Supreme Court has upheld Congress' authority to condition
receipt of Federal financial assistance on acceptance by the States or other
recipients of conditions regarding or related to the use of that assistance, as
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court has
further recognized that Congress may require a State, as a condition of
receipt of Federal financial assistance, to waive the State's sovereign
immunity to suits for a violation of Federal law, as in College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666
(1999). In the wake of the Kimel decision, in order to assure compliance
with, and to provide effective remedies for violations of, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 in State programs or activities
receiving or using Federal financial assistance, and in order to ensure that
Federal financial assistance does not subsidize or facilitate violations of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, it is necessary to require
such a waiver as a condition of receipt or use of that assistance.
(8) A State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance in any program
or activity of a State will constitute a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
under Section 7(g) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (as
added by section 4 of this Act). The waiver will not ellminate a State's
immunity with respect to programs or activities that do not receive or use
Federal financial assistance. The State will waive sovereign immunity only
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of this exercise of power by the Congress, under its taxing
and spending power, is beyond the scope of this article.
How extensive is the harm done to disabled persons by
Garrett?
Garrett focused on Title I's prohibition of employment discrimination.
But there are other forms of
discrimination by states that are of great importance to
disabled persons. Some of these are covered by Title II of the
ADA. which provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
211
discrimination by any such entity."
A "public 212
entity" is
defined to include "any State or local government."
Title II
thus provides vitally important protections for disabled
persons in the areas of public education, public
transportation, public housing, access to public buildings,
access to services and programs generally available to the
public, freedom from physical barriers to voting, access to
public recreation sites, and a myriad of other areas in which
state discrimination against disabled persons, or state failure
to accommodate their needs, blocks full inclusion of disabled
persons in those aspects of daily life their fellow citizens take
for granted. Title II of the ADA thus directly seeks to achieve
the congressional purpose of "[invoking] the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
273
people with disabilities."
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his opinion in Garrett by
limiting the scope of the opinion to Title I of the ADA. He
wrote: "We decide here whether employees of the State of
with respect to suits under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 brought by employees within the programs or activities that receive or
use that assistance. With regard to those programs or activities that are
covered by the waiver, the State employees will be accorded only the same
remedies that are accorded to other covered employees under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967."
Id. at *55459. On September 3, 2001, Senate Bill 928 was favorably acted upon and
reported to the Senate by the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Committee.
271. 42 u.s.c. § 12132 (1994).
272. Id.§ 1213l(l)(A).
273. Id.§ 1210l(b)(4) (ADA Findings and Purpose).
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Alabarria may recover money darriages by reason of the
State's failure to comply with the provisions of Title I of the
274
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."
Focusing on a
possible claim that Title II, like Title I, might encompass a
prohibition against employment discrimination, the Chief
Justice wrote the following:
Respondents' complaints in the United States District Court
alleged violations of both Title I and Title II of the
ADA ... [N]o par1y has briefed the question whether. Title II
of the ADA. dealing with the "services, programs, or
activities of a public entity". . . is available for claims of
employment discrimination when Title I of the ADA
expressly deals with the subject .... We are not disposed
to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which
has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is
appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when the parties have
not favored us with
275
briefing on the statutory question.

The majority opinion emphasized that the congressional
record, including the House and Senate Committee Reports,
focused on state discrimination in "public accommodations,
276
public services, transportation, and telecommunications."
Similarly, the Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Justice
Breyer, listing state by state "[s]ubmissions made by
individuals to the Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of
Americans .with Disabilities," 2 ". focused almost entirely on
non-employment areas of state discrimination and state
failure to reasonably accommodate. These areas of
discrimination are covered by Title II, not Title I, of the ADA.
. Therefore, the congressional record that the majority deemed
inadequate to support Congress' exercise of Section 5 power
when it. enacted Title I of the ADA may be adequate to
convince at least one member of the Garrett majority that
Congress properly exercised its Section 5 power when it
enacted Title II of the ADA.
Garrett dealt only with Title I actions and does not
preclude federal court actions by private individuals
challenging conduct by states that violates Title II.
274. 531 U.S. at 360.
275. Id. at 360 n. l.
276. Id. at 371-72 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 28 (1990)).
277. Id. at 391 {Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately for victims of Title II violations, remedies
available under Title II may not be as extensive as remedies
that are available under Title I. The ADA incorporates the
remedial provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
for violations of Title I, whereas the remedial
provisions of
278
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
are used for
279
violations of Title II of the ADA.
B. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources
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Many disability actions brought under Title II seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief will be undermined by the
Court's recent decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 280 involving awards of attorney's fees under the
ADA and other civil rights.statutes. Buckhannon arose when
a state fire marshal ordered that an assisted living residence
be closed because some of the disabled residents were unable
to vacate the premises without assistance in the event of
fire. 281 The group home brought an action under Title II of the
ADA and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
(FHAA), 282 on behalf of itself, similarly situated group homes,
and group home residents. While discovery was progressing,
the West Virginia Legislature enacted legislation that
eliminated the statutory requirement that led to the order by
the state fire marshal. The plaintiffs then sought attorney's
fees as a "prevailing party" under the FHAA and ADA. The
FHAA provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee and
costs." 283 The ADA provides that "the court .. ., in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
278. 42 u.s.c. § 2oood (1994).
279. For a discussion of Title II remedy issues, see Cheryl L. Anderson, Damages
for Intentional Discrimination by Public Entities under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Rose by Any Other Name, But Are the Remedies the Same?, 9 BYU
J. PuB. L. 235 (1995); Leonard J. Augustine, Jr., Disabling the Relationship Between

Intentional Discrimination and Compensatory Damages under Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 592 (1998).

280.
281.
282.
283.

532 U.S. 598 (2001).
Id. at 601.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
42 U.S.C. §3613(c)(2) (1994).
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attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs .... "
The plaintiffs relied upon the catalyst theory, under
which "a plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it achieves the
desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary
285
change in the defendant's conduct."
The decision by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas, rejected the catalyst theory. Rather
than focusing upon the intent of Congress in enacting the
attorney's fees provisions of the ADA, FHAA. and other civil
rights statutes - most notably the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976286 - the Court placed primary reliance on
the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "prevailing party"
as a
287
"party in whose favor a judgment is rendered . . . . "
The
Court criticized the catalyst theory because it "allows an
award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the
288
legal relationship of the parties."
The Court concluded:
A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve
by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on
the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding
that the term "prevailing party" authorizes an award of
attorney's fees without a corresJ'onding
alteration in the
26
legal relationship of the parties.
Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justices Breyer,
Souter, and Stevens, harshly qiticized the majority opinion,
in part because of its break with established lower court
precedent. Her opinion noted:
Prior to 1994, every Federal Court of Appeals (except the
Federal Circuit, which had not addressed the issue)
concluded that plaintiffs in situations like Buckhannon's
and Pierce's could obtain a fee award if their suit acted as a
"catalyst" for the change they sought, even if they did not
obtain a judgment or consent decree. The Courts of
Appeals found it "clear that a party may be considered to
have prevailed even when the legal action stops short of
final. . . judgment due to intervening mootness."
Interpreting the term "prevailing party" in "a practical
sense" . . . federal courts across the country held that a
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. §12205.
532 U.S. at 601.
42 u.s.c. § 1988 (1994).
532 U.S. at 602 (quoting BLACK'S !AW DIC110NARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)).

288. Id. at 606.
289. Id.
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party "prevails" for fee-shifting purposes when
"its ends are
290
accomplished as a result of the litigation."
The dissenters criticized the Court's decision because it
"allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a
plaintiffs counsel fees, even though the suit's merit led the
defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on,
to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal
91
redress sought in the complaint.'" The dissenters concluded
that "the Court's constricted definition of 'prevailing party,'
and consequent rejection of the 'catalyst theory,' impede
access to court for the less well-heeled, and shrink the
incentive Congress created for the enforcement of federal law
292
by private attorneys general."
Buckhannon's impact on ADA Title I employment
discrimination actions will be limited because most of these
actions seek money damages, and a pre-trial settlement
normally will provide funds for attorney's fees, either as part
of the settlement agreement or through · the retainer
agreement between the attorney and client. However, as
discussed above, Buckhannon will have a significant impact
on Title II actions. It also will have an
impact on many
293
actions brought under Title III of the ADA alleging disability
discrimination, or failure to reasonably accommodate, by
private sector places of public accommodation. Title Ill
covers entities such as hotels, motels, restaurants,
entertainment facilities, amusement parks, retail stores,
health care providers, and law firms. For Title Ill violations,
the ADA incorporates the remedial provisions of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,294 which limits the remedy to "preventive relief." 295 Under Buckhannon, voluntary compliance
with Title III on the eve of trial (compelled by the pending
litigation) may block an award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted}.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 622-23.
42 u.s.c. §12181 (1994).
Id.
§ 2000a.
Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits public accommodation
discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The Title II remedial
provision provides that "a civil action for preventive relief, including an application
for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be
instituted by the person aggrteved . ... " Id.§ 2000a-3(a}.
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who sought declaratory and injunctive relief from public
accommodations discrimination that affects large numbers of
disabled persons. The Garrett decision blocking, on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, private actions against states under
Title I for employment discrimination, and the Buckhannon
decision, eliminating the catalyst theory for attorney's fees
awards in law suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
in ADA and other civil rights actions, deliver a devastating
double blow to disabled persons and their advocates.

'

V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DEVELOPMENTS

A. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company

The Supreme Court upheld well established circuit court
Title VII precedent in two October 2000 Term cases, Pollard v.
296
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
and Clark County School
297
District v. Breeden.
Pollard concerned front pay awards in
Title VII actions, and Clark County involved retaliation
discrimination because of opposition to practices made
unlawful by Title VII and participation in proceedings under
Title VII.
In Pollard, the unanimous decision written by Justice
Thomas298 supported the Title VII front pay remedy in two
ways. First, 'it confirmed the appropriateness of front pay as a
remedy in general. Second, it held that front pay as a remedy
is not subject to the dollar amount limitations ("caps")
299
established by the Civil Rights Act of 1991
for
00
compensatory and punitive damages under Title VIL '
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001).
121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001).
Justice O'Connor did not participate.
42 U.S.C. §§ 198l(a)(l) & (2) (1994).
42 U.S.C. §198la(b)(3) (1994) provides, In relevant part:

Limitations - The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded
under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under
this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party- {A) in the case of
a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
$50,000; {B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer

--
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Sharon Pollard worked as an operator in the hydrogen
peroxide area of a DuPont plant in Tennessee. She was the
victim of severe co-worker sexual harassment. which caused
serious emotional harm and led to her need for short term
disability leave. The harassment included sabotage of her
work through false alarms. and the use by her principal
harasser of the terms "bitches," "cunts," and "heifers" to
describe women. 301 The triggering event that caused Pollard
to take disability leave was an incident in which a male coworker placed "a Bible on her desk, opened to a passage
which read, 'I do not permit a woman 302
to teach or have
authority over a man. She must be silent. "'
In her testimony, Pollard described her "nightmares,
fear
303
of crowds, nausea, anxiety, and sleeplessness."
She was
examined by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, each of whom
testified at trial that "she suffered from post-traumatic stress
11304

disorder.
DuPont's liabilty for the co-worker sexual harassment
was established by evidence of a "pervasively hostile
environment [that] unreasonably interfered with [Pollard's]
work performance," 305 and by evidence that Pollard's supervisors repeatedly were informed of the co-worker harassment
and took no meaningful corrective action. Steve Carney, a
control room operator who was primarily responsible for the
harassment, "never received a formal written reprimand, was
never suspended from his job, and was
never transferred to
306
another shift, demoted, or terminated."
When Pollard discussed her return from disability leave
with DuPont management, she was told that they "would not
guarantee that [she] would not be put back on a shift with
than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000: {C) in the case of a respondent who has
more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and (D) in the
case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
301. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, Inc., 16-F.Supp. 2d 913, 915 (W.D. Tenn.
1998). affd. 213 F.3d 933 (6th Cir. 2000), reu'd, 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001).
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 914.
Id. at 923.
Id
Id. at 922.
Id. at 924.
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Carney."'0 ' Pollard was terminated when she said
that "she
308
could not return to work under those conditions."
These compelling facts led to the district court's remedy
dilemma. The court concluded that compensatory damages
for emotional pain and suffering, front pay, and punitive
damages were appropriate given the egregious nature of the
co-worker sexual harassment and inadequate management
response. As the court expressed it, "This situation was
reprehensible. This is a case of wretched indifference to an
employee who was slowly drowning in an environment that
was completely unacceptable, while her employer sat by and
watched." 309 However, the district court was
bound by the
0
Sixth Circuit decision in Hudson v. Reno," in which a three
judge panel held that front pay is a form of compensatory
damages available to plaintiffs for intentional discrimination
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and thus is subject to the
caps on compensatory damages set forth in the Act. The
district court discussed the insufficiency of the $300,000 of
compensatory damages, which included front pay, awarded to
Pollard:

The Court notes. that the $300,000 award is, in fact,
insufficient to compensate plaintiff for the psychological
damage, pain, and humiliation she has suffered, in addition
to the·loss of a lucrative career and secure retirement. The
Court is bound by the statutory cap set forth in §198la
however, and carmot award plaintiff compensatory damages
in eiccess of that cap.
Because the amount of compensatory damages awarded by
the Court is $300,000, the Court is thus prohibited by the
statutory cap from awarding plaintiff any punitive
damages .... For the record, however, the Court finds that
punitive damages are justified in this case, as defendant
has "engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of
an aggrieved individual ... and, absent the statutory cap,
the Court would have awarded punitive damages based
upon DuPont's repeated failure to remedy this egregious
311
situation.

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 921.
Id.
Id. at 924.
130 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir. 1997).
16 F. Supp. 2d at 924 n.19 (citations and quotation omitted).
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On appeal the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel
expressed its disagreement with Hudson v. Reno, but
concluded:
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[O]ur hands are tied. One panel of this court may not
overturn the decision of another panel of this court - that
may only be accomplished through an en bane
consideration of the argument. Plaintiff does not purport to
distinguish Hudson.
Therefore, we must decline to
overturn the district court's decision that front pay is
included in the com2ensatory damages statutory cap found
312
in 42 U.S.C. §198la.

The Supreme Court took the approach of all circuits
other than the Sixth. and concluded that front pay .in Title VII
cases is not subject to the caps set forth in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. The Court began with a discussion of Section
706(gl of Title VII, as amended in 1972, which authorizes a
court to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
313
hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any
other equitable relief' as the court deems appropriate."
Lower federal courts rely upon this section in granting front
pay in lieu of reinstatement in situations where reinstatement
would be inequitable, because of harmful impact on third
parties or for other reasons, or where reinstatement is not
feasible or desirable because of a breakdown in the
relationship between the plaintiff employee and the defendant
employer. As the Supreme Court put it, "By 1991, virtually
all of the courts of appeals had recognized that 'front pay' was
a remedy authorized by §706(gJ. In fact, no
court of appeals
314
appears to have ever held to the contrary."
Turning to the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Court noted that the phrase "compensatory damages" is not
defined in the Act."' and that. "[i]n the abstract, front pay
could be considered compensation for 'future pecuniary
losses' in which case it would be subject to the statutory
cap." 316 The Court then stated that "we must not analyze one
312. Pollard v. E.L DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 945 (6th Cir. 2000),
rev'd 121 S. Ct. 1946 (2001).
313. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(l) (1994).
314. 121 S. Ct. at 1950-51.
315. Id. at 1951.
316. Id.
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term of §198la in isolation," 317 and concluded: "When §l98la
is read as a whole, the better interpretation is that front pay
is not within the meaning of compensatory damages in
§198la(b)(3), and thus front pay is excluded from the
318

statutory cap."
The Court acknowledged that Congress intended to create
additional remedies for Title VII plaintiffs, whereas applying
19
caps to front pay would reduce the available remedy.' The
Court quoted §198l(a)(l) which provides, in relevant part,
that "the complaining party may recover compensatory and
punitive damages ... in addition to any relief authorized
by
20
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... "'
The
Court then confirmed the prevailing view of the courts of
appeals that Section 706(g) does, in fact, permit the award of
front pay, in lieu of reinstatement, and held, "Because front
pay is a remedy authorized under §706(g), Congress did not
limit the availability of such awards in §198la. Instead,
Congress sought to expand the available remedies by
permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages in addition to previously available remedies, such as
321

front pay."
The ·Court's decision in Pollard is consistent with
congressional intent'22 and avoids many problems. For
example, federal courts grant reinstatement in Title VII

0

317. Id.
318. Id.
319. The Court wrote:
Congress -expressly found that "additional remedies under Federal law are
needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace," without giving any indication that it wished to curtail previously
available remedies.
Congress therefore made clear through the plain

language of the statute that the remedies newly authorized under §198la
were in addition to the relief authorized by §706(g).
Id. (citation omitted).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1952.
322. Senator Kennedy spoke on the floor of the Senate concerning the final
version of the bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as follows:
"Compensatory damages do not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other
type o[f} relief authorized under Section 706{g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
including front pay." 137 Cong. Rec. Sl5233-02, Sl5234 (1991). Similarly, the
Interpretive Memorandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Danforth
and other Republican senators stated that "limitations . . . placed on damages ...
under Section 1981A ... cannot include backpay, the interest thereon, frontpay, or
any other relief authorized under Title VII ... ," Id. at Sl5472-0l, S15483.
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termination cases if reinstatement is feasible and equitable,
but often conclude that front pay in lieu of reinstatement is a
more equitable remedy. If caps were placed on front pay
awards, the result in many cases would be for courts to order
reinstatement to preserve plaintiffs' ability to be made whole
with other forms of compens.atory damages. This would
happen even though front pay otherwise would be a more
appropriate remedy than reinstatement, either because it
would avoid unnecessary workplace disruption, or because it
would avoid hardship for an employee who, like Sharon
Pollard, would be returning to a poisoned and hostile
323

workplace.
Caps on front pay awards would undermine judicial
efficiency. The possibility that a jury might award front pay
would force a federal judge to decide if the equitable remedy
of reinstatement should be used rather than front pay, and
the judge would neecl to make this determination, at the
latest, before all of .the evidence is presented and before
closing arguments. 324 Caps on front pay awards also would
motivate some employers to continue in their unlawful
practices once they realize that the fmancial exposure they
faced had reached the applicable cap, a cap that includes the
front pay and compensatory and punitive damages they may
325

have to pay.
The decision by the Court in Pollard reflects the intent of
Congress, when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to
provide additional remedies for victims of intentional
employment discrimination. The decision also preserves front
pay as a means for making whole victims of employment
discrimination and for motivating employers to comply
voluntarily with Title VII.
B. Clark County Sclwol District v. Breeden

The Court's per curiam decision in Clark County Sclwol
District v. Breeden326 reversed an unpublished Ninth Circuit
he final
follows:
,ny other
>f 1964,
;irly, the
,)anforth
:.ages ...

1tpay, or

323. Pollard, Brief for the Petitioner, No. 00-763, 121 S. Ct. 1946. 2000 U.S. Briefs
(Lexis) 763 at '38-49.

324. Id
325. Id. at '45.
326. 121 S. Ct. 1508 (2001).
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panel decision in favor of the plaintiff in a Title VII action
alleging retaliation because of opposition to practices made
unlawful by Title VII and because of participation in
proceedings under Title VII. 327 The district court had granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings at the
trial level.
Shirley Breeden worked as an administrator in the
Human Resources Division of the Clark County School
District. Her duties included review of job applications and
related materials. The incident that gave rise to her law suit
occurred at a staff meeting she attended with her supervisor,
Don Eldfrick, and her subordinate, Jim Mcintosh. The three
administrators reviewed a psychological evaluation report
which stated that a job applicant once said to a co-worker, "I
hear making love to you is like malting love to the Grand
Canyon." 328 Eldfrick looked at Breeden and said, "I don't
know what that means." 329 Mcintosh responded, "Well, I'll tell
331
you later," 330 and both men "chuckled."
Breeden was offended by the comments and laughter of
the two men. Later in the day, she complained to Eldfrick
and to his supervisor, George Ann Rice. In her subsequent
judicial complaint, Breeden alleged that she suffered
retaliation from Eldfrick because of the complaints, in the
form of hostile treatment on the job.
Breeden 'filed charges with the Nevada Equal Rights
Corpmission and the EEOC, received a notice of right to sue
from the EEOC, and filed an action in federal court. Breeden
alleged that she suffered retaliation, in the form of a transfer,
because of.her judicial complaint. After it became clear that

327. Section 704(a} of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment .. , because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title. or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1994). The first and second parts of Section 704(a) are known,
respectively, as the opposition clause and participation clause.

328.
329.
330.
331.

121 S. Ct. at 1509.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Rice decided to transfer Breeden before the complaint was
filed and served on the school district, and before Rice knew
about the law suit, Breeden alleged that the transfer was
made in response to the school district's receipt of its copy of
the notice of right to sue.
This second allegation related to her participation in
proceedings under Title VII. Charging parties are protected
from retaliation if they can prove a causal link between their
participation and an adverse employment action. In the view
of the circuit court panel, Breeden "raised a genuine issue of
material fact and has alleged sufficient facts to survive
summary judgment."332 The court of appeals reviewed
the
333
record and found a possible "causal link"
between
participation activity and the transfer because:
Rice's discussion about transferring Breeden occurred
approximately three months after the EEOC's right-to-sue
letter was sent to both parties, and her final decision to
reassign Breeden occurred less than one month after she
learned of the suit, both of which events are sufficiently
proximate in time to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
causation.
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334

By the time the case reached the. Supreme Court, Breeden
was relying only upon a causal connection between the notice
of right to sue and the transfer decision. The Court reviewed
the record and disagreed with the court of appeals concerning
the causation significance of the employer's receipt of
Breeden's notice of right to sue. The Court viewed the facts
as follows:
The Ninth Circuit's opinion . . . suggests that the letter
provided petitioner with its first notice of respondent's
charge before the EEOC, and hence allowed the inference
that the transfer proposal made three months later was
petitioner's reaction to the charge. This will not do. First,
there is no indication that Rice even knew about the rightto-sue letter when she proposed transferring respondent.
And second, if one presumes she knew about it, one must
also presume that she (or her predecessor) knew almost two
years earlier about the protected action (filing of the EEOC

lgation,
.known,

332. Breeden v. Clark County School Distriet, 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision}, available at 2000 WL 991821,·at **3.
333. Id.
334. Id. (citing Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp .. 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that four months provides sufficient proximity to establish a causal
link)).
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complaint) that the letter supposedly disclosed . . . . The
cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an
employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse
employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to
establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the
temporal proximity must be "very close," .... Action taken
(as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at
all.335

Tue Court's presumption that the decision-maker Rice
knew about the filing of the EEOC charge "almost two years
earlier," and the Court's apparent conclusion that the
transfer decision thus would have been motivated by the
earlier charge filing and not the more recent receipt by the
employer of the notice of right to sue, led the Court to a
different conclusion from that of the court of appeals
concerning the causation link between protected activity and
the transfer decision. That is, the court of appeals focused
upon a three month time period, beginning with receipt by
the employer of the notice of right to sue, whereas the
Supreme Court focused upon a twenty month time period,
beginning with notice to the employer of the initial EEOC
charge. With respect to proof of causation through focus
upon the amount of time between the decision-maker's first
having knowledge of the relevant protected activity and the
transfer decision, there is a genuine issue of material fact
that should have been decided"by a jury, and one wonders
why the ~upreme Court wandered into the domain of the jury
on this issue.
The Court's discussion of the opposition claim does seem
to have doctrinal significance. Tue Ninth Circuit, consistent
with all other circuits, concluded there need not be an actual
violation of Title VII for opposition to be protected. Instead, in
the view of the Ninth Circuit, Breeden must have had a
336
"reasonable, good faith belief' that Title VII was violated.
The Supreme Court adopted this approach, without
adopting the specific language used by the Ninth Circuit. It
wrote:

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied §
2000e-3(a) to protect employee "oppos[ition]" not just to
practices that are actually "made ... unlawful" by Title VII,

335. 121 S. Ct. at 1511 {citations omitted).
336. 2000WL991821,at"l.
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but also practices tbat tbe employee could reasonably
believe were unlawful .... We have no occasion to rule on
the propriety of tbis interpretation, because even assuming
it is correct, no one could reasonably 337
believe tbat tbe
incident recounted above violated Title VII.
Circuit court of appeals opinions in all but the Sixth
Circuit, and district court opinions in the Sixth Circuit, have
considered what the Title VII legal test should be for
opposition retaliation. They unanimously have concluded
that an actual violation of Title VII is not required, but that
the plaintiff must believe that a violation has occurred, and
this belief must be a reasonable one under the
circumstances.
Some circuits describe this requirement
338
through use of the phrase "reasonable belief," while other
circuits describe the same requirement through combined
339
use of the phrases "good faith," and "reasonable belief."
Despite the difference in phraseology, all circuits are
describing a similar requirement of subjective belief combined
with objective reasonable belief that Title VII has been
violated.
The Court's opinion in Breeden seemingly establishes
that the Supreme Court accepts the unanimous view of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals that actionable opposition
retaliation does not require an actual violation of Title VII, but
does require that the plaintiff believe Title VII has been
violated and that a reasonable person, under the same
circumstances, would believe that Title VII has been violated.
The Court's endorsement of this lower court doctrine was not
stated directly, but would seem to be implicit in the Court's
rejection of Breeden's claim because "no one could reasonably

cl

Jut
. It

337. 121 S. Ct. at 1509 (citations omitted).
338. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 265 F.3d 903, 913 (9th Cir.
2001): Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp., 224 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2000); EEOC v.
HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1998); Childress v. City of Richmond, 120
F.3d 476, 482 (4th Cir. 1997); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994);
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 865 (3d Cir. 1990); Payne v.
McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 {5th Cir. 1981}. The
phrase "reasonable belief' is used in a Sixth Circuit district court opinion. Crockwell
v. Blackmon-Mooring Steamatic, Inc., 627 F.Supp. 800, 807 n.5 {W.D. Tenn. 1985).
339. See, e.g., McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 283 {2d Cir. 2001);
Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999); Parker v.
Baltimore and Ohio RR, 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The phrase "good
faith, reasonable belief' is used in a Sixth Circuit district court case. Miller v. Rudd,
2001WL242588, at '15 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
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believe that the incident recounted above violated Title VII."
The Court more clearly articulated an objective standard
when it wrote, "No reasonable person could have believed that
the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's
11341
standard.
Breeden may present an example of the type of incident
that would be subjectively offensive to some people, but that
falls so short of the mark for actionable sexual harassment
that a reasonable person would not conclude that Title VII
has been violated. As the Court held in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 342 "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment."' 343 Regardless of the extent, or unfairness, of retaliation suffered by an employee because of his or
her opposition to an employer's practice, the employee is
protected by Section 704(a) only if the practice opposed
violates Title VII or the employee has a reasonable belief that
it violates Title VII.
VI.

CONCLUSION

On balance, the October 2000 Term of the Supreme
Court significantly undermined protections provided to
employees by employment discrimination statutes. Circuit
City p,ermits employers to force employees to waive their
rights to a judicial forum for vindication of federal and state
statutory rights, and Garrett eliminates the ADA as a
meaningful source of protection for state employees from
disability discrimination by state government employers. The
October 2000 Term's erosion of the rights of employees is
part of a more general pattern in which five members of the
court, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Thomas and Scalia, have joined together to tilt the
scales against employees in cases before the Court.

340. 121 S. Ct. at 1509.
341. Id. at 1510.
342. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
343. Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied. 406 U.S. 957 (1972): Henson v. Dundee. 682 F.2d 897. 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
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Therefore, the outcome in many employment cases in the
future will be determined by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor,
as they join either Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas in undermining employee rights, or
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens in supporting
the rights of employees in the workplace.
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